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Summary: Literature Review and Self-evaluation 
1 Introduction: Research context 
China has new corporate champions. These multinationals, firms like Haier, Huawei and Mindray, 
have entered developed markets like Europe and the United States of America (USA). [..] It's clear 
that a new breed of Chinese company is emerging that is able to compete on the world stage. 
---British Broadcasting Corporation, 28 February 2012 
China is now very strange for many Europeans: It triggers the fear that Chinese companies will 
buy up German ones. [..] What is harmless for individual companies is threatening the German 
economy. The real dangers such as industrial espionage and the gradual loss of competitiveness - 
these are real dangers for a country that sees its strength in the superior quality of its research and 
development. The transfer of knowledge, coupled with acquisitions, can accelerate the loss of these 
advantages. 
---Financial Times Germany, 15 June 2011 
The stories about „Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI)‟ or „Chinese multinational 
enterprises (MNEs)‟ have recently made front-page news in the major global newspapers. This new, fast-
growing and substantial FDI, especially the trend to developed economies, has raised many doubts in the 
public mind as mentioned above: why do the Chinese firms come to our country, since “made in China” 
means cheap products and low quality? Are they coming here to take the technology back to China which 
may cause many employees to lose their jobs here? These doubts are partly due to the limited knowledge 
about the Chinese outward FDI, and partly because it is a Chinese phenomenon. Compared with developed 
country MNEs, Chinese firms have some distinct characteristics: 
 They are regarded as latecomer firms (LCFs), which are late entrants to industries, not purposely 
but due to historical need. They do not possess ownership advantages initially, for example they 
lack technology and global market access (Mathews, 2002); 
 Their investment overseas is increasingly driven by asset augmentation, namely technology, 
management and brand. (Dunning et al., 2008); 
 Their investment is highly influenced by the home government which orchestrates a catch-up 
strategy (Fan, 2011). 
Chinese outward FDI challenges the classic internationalization theories, which are based on the 
observation of traditional FDI from developed economies that are historically, economically and 
institutionally different from China (Liefner and Zeng, 2008). It is questionable whether these theories are 
applicable to Chinese outward FDI. The empirical studies on FDI from China can benefit the further 
development of these theories. 
Despite the significant theoretical and empirical meanings of Chinese outward FDI, the related 
research remains at the initial stage. Therefore, this dissertation is concerned with two major issues: the 
general image of Chinese outward FDI, i.e. historical development and geographical distribution, and the 
motivation and difficulties of Chinese firms in developed economies. Germany is taken as an example. 
This summary part is organized as follows: the discussion will begin with the mainstream theories 
from the international business (IB) field on FDI and new perspectives enlightening the study on FDI from 
China. I will then summarize the empirical studies on Chinese outward FDI and the stream to Germany. 
The last section provides a conclusion, including a summary of the methodology and data, the main 
theoretical and empirical findings and the potential further research. 
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2 Theoretical perspectives 
Most research on FDI has been conducted in the IB field. The three prevailing IB theories, namely the 
Ownership-Location-Internalization advantage model (OLI model), the Investment Development Path (IDP) 
theory and the Uppsala Internationalization process model (Uppsala model for short) cannot fully explain 
the internationalization of Chinese firms. It has been argued that other business, social or economic 
geography (EG) perspectives can been integrated into the FDI research to create new models (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2007). Each new perspective corresponds to 
the new characteristics of FDI from China mentioned previously. In this section, I will briefly introduce the 
three IB models and then the new perspectives and their contribution to FDI research. The detailed 
information about each theory please refers to the theoretical parts in the articles 1 to 4. 
2.1 Mainstream theoretical research on FDI 
The OLI model and the IDP theory: The mainstream FDI theories, which were developed in the 1980s 
based on the experiences of MNEs from developed countries (Dunning, 1988; 1993), are comprised of two 
related parts: the OLI model and the IDP theory. The OLI model focuses on the MNEs‟ behavior with the 
assumption that firms will internationalize on the basis of a definable competitive advantage, such as 
superior proprietary resources or managerial capabilities concerning know-how, reputation, the value chain 
and marketing, that allows them to secure enough return to cover the additional costs and risks associated 
with operating abroad. This also means that internationalization is motivated by a firm‟s wish to exploit its 
existing ownership advantages. Therefore, it focuses on the overseas possibilities for asset-exploitation 
(Dunning and Narula, 1996). The IDP theory relates the outward and inward FDI position of a country to a 
country‟s level and structure of economic development. According to the IDP, outward FDI is expected to 
be undertaken only when a country has reached a certain minimum level of development, at which time 
ownership advantages may have evolved among firms in that country. The outward FDI pattern will 
therefore reflect the evolving nature of ownership advantages of domestic firms as well as changes in the 
advantages of the home economy vis-à-vis potential host economies. Table 1 lists the main points of the 
OLI model, the IDP theory and their linkages. 
Table 1 The main contents of the IDP path and the OLI model 
IDP FDI position FDI types OLI advantage 
Stage I (GNP 
pc:<$2000) 
Modest IDI & limited 
outward FDI 
 Asset exploiting 
 Natural resource 
seeking 
 Market seeking 
 Efficiency 
seeking 
 Asset augmenting 
 Created asset & 
competence 
seeking 
 Ownership 
Initially mainly country- 
specific; later becoming 
more firm-specific 
 Location 
Access & use of local 
resources, capabilities, 
institutions & markets 
 Internationalization 
Utilization of ownership & 
location through 
internalization 
Stage II (GNP 
pc:$2000-$3500) 
Outward FDI beginning 
in lower technology 
sectors 
Stage III (GNP 
pc:$3500-$8000) 
Intra-industry FDI 
increases 
Stage IV (GNP 
pc:>$8000) 
FDI in higher technology 
sectors & outward FDI 
rising faster than IDI  
Stage V Balanced NOI 
Note: GNP is short for gross national product, IDI for inward direct investment, NOI for net outward FDI  
Source: adapted from Dunning et al., 2008 
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The Uppsala model: This is another prominent FDI theory. According to this model, the most 
important obstacle to internationalization is lack of knowledge, which can be reduced through incremental 
decision-making and experiential learning about the foreign markets and operations (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). Therefore, firms would subsequently formalize their overseas operations in individual countries in 
the order of the establishment chain - no regular export activities, export via independent representatives, 
sales subsidiary and production/manufacturing. Firms have the choice tendency as well: first 
geographically and culturally close countries, and then more distant countries after gaining overseas 
experience. The Uppsala model is quite different from the OLI model (Table 2). Firstly, it is developed 
based on the empirical observation of enterprises from Sweden, which has comparatively small domestic 
markets, while the OLI model is based on MNE practices from the USA. Secondly, it is a behavioral model 
of gradual internationalization rooted in the knowledge-based view. It studies the whole process of 
internationalization, while the OLI model pays more attention to the spectacular overseas investment of 
mature MNEs (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). Hence, the Uppsala model has advantages in 
analyzing the earlier internationalization period of MNEs involving knowledge learning and experimental 
learning. 
Table 2 The comparison between the OLI model and the Uppsala model 
 OLI model Uppsala model 
Theoretical 
approach 
Neo-classic perspective Behavior, dynamic and evolutionary 
perspective 
Time period The operations of the firms during 
later years when they have already 
become large and international 
The whole process including the period of 
becoming and being and MNE 
Assumption A firm internationalizes on the basis 
of absolute competitive advantage 
despite obstacles of foreignness 
The most important obstacles to 
internationalization are lack of knowledge and 
resources. These obstacles are reduced 
through incremental decision-making and 
learning about the foreign markets and 
operations. 
Location choices Ethnocentric/polycentric Geocentric/regiocentric 
Empirical 
foundation 
Large enterprises, from the USA in 
particular 
Small and medium-size enterprises, from 
small domestic markets such as Sweden 
Representative 
scholars 
Dunning Johanson, Vahle and Wiedersheim-Paul 
Source: Own draft 
2.2 Theories on emerging country FDI from other perspectives 
Besides IB theories, the theories from other fields also contribute to the research on developing country 
MNEs. Here, I will briefly introduce four theories, the importance of which has been accepted: institutions 
theory, the linkage-leverage-learning (LLL) model, network theory and the proximities study (Table 3). 
  
 
Table 3 New perspectives of developing country MNEs research 
Themes Institutions theory LLL model  Network theory Proximities 
Main disciplines Social science Strategic management Social science and organization 
studies 
Knowledge management and 
geography 
Representative  
scholars 
 Li and Peng (2008); Peng et 
al. (2008) 
 Cantwell et al. (2010); 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) 
 Voss et al. (2009); Buckley 
et al. (2008) 
 Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) 
 Mathews (2002, 2006) 
 Rugman and Verke (2007) 
 Coviello and Munro (1997); 
Coviello (2006) 
 Nooteboom (2000, 2007) 
 Hess (2004) 
 Boschma (2005) 
 Huber (2012) 
 
Analytical Focus  Integrating institutions into 
IB theories 
 Policy influences on FDI 
 Institutional environment 
and MNE behavior 
 Catch-up process and active 
knowledge acquisition 
 Linkage between developed 
country MNEs and developing 
country LCFs 
 Network positions and 
internationalization 
 Liability of outsidership (LOO) 
 Cognitive proximity 
 Organizational proximity 
 Social proximity 
 Institutional proximity 
Corresponding 
characters of Chinese 
FDI 
 Highly influenced by the 
home government  
 
 LCFs 
 Driven by technique seeking. 
 Investment in developed 
economies 
 Highly integrated into global 
value chains 
 Linkage with foreign customers 
and buyers before investment 
 Geographically scattered 
 A large portion of FDI 
flows into developed 
economies 
Source: Own draft 
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Institutional theory: The broader new institutionalism movement has been prominent throughout the 
social sciences in the last three decades pioneered by economists (North, 1990) and sociologists (Scott, 
2001). It is viewed as one of the top three most insightful theories when probing into emerging economies 
and the third pillar of studying FDI from developing and emerging economies (Peng et al., 2008). The 
institutional theory has commented that these economies, especially China, are typically characterized by 
an active governmental involvement in business, both through ownership and through regulation (Zeng and 
Bathelt, 2011). The political and sociological support is important for Chinese firms to acquire assets that 
enable them to compete in the world market. To be specific, the institutional research focuses on three 
aspects: establishing the theoretical framework which integrates the institutional perspective into the 
existing IB models (Dunning and Lundan 2008; and references therein); analyzing policy and government 
influences on FDI development on the macro level (Voss et al., 2009; and reference therein); and the 
effects of the institutional environment on the foreign investment strategies of developing country MNEs 
(Child and Tsai, 2005; and reference therein). 
LLL model: Catching-up theories were derived from the study of late industrializing countries such 
as Germany and Austria in Europe during the 19th century, and were subsequently used to explain the 
phenomenon marked by LCFs from Japan and subsequently from East Asian newly industrialized countries 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000). Among the catching-up theories, the LLL model utilizes the case of LCFs 
from the Asia-Pacific region breaking into knowledge-intensive industries to illustrate the dynamics of the 
LCFs‟ catching-up process. Against the background of globalization, it argues that LCFs should not be too 
concerned about generating new knowledge, but rather about integrating themselves into existing value 
chains - constructed either by MNEs or by advanced firms from developed countries looking to globalize 
their value chains of production, logistics and research and development (R&D) – in order to adapt existing 
capabilities as fast as possible for their catch-up endeavors. Linkage, leverage and learning are the three 
steps for knowledge acquisition and catching up (Mathews, 2000). This model is later applied to the 
explanation of the LCFs‟ internationalization. It argues that LCFs attach the highest importance to ensuring 
that national firms become global players through an emphasis on outward FDI as well as on inward FDI. 
While inward FDI can be used to promote linkages within the domestic economy, outward FDI is a way of 
building linkages with the global economy. Accordingly, outward FDI is undertaken by LCFs to facilitate 
technological access due to the fact that they are constrained by assimilation capabilities and policy 
distortion in their home countries (Mathews, 2007). 
Network theory: A number of studies have demonstrated the role of networks in the 
internationalization of firms. Coviello and Munro (1997) conducted empirical studies of the 
internationalization of small software firms. They found that network relationships have an impact on 
foreign market selection as well as on the mode of entry in the context of ongoing network processes. 
Martin et al. (1998) stated that the inter-organizational relationships of suppliers, especially those with 
buyers, affected their pattern of international expansion. Moreover, Coviello (2006) developed a model of 
“how international new venture networks evolve‟‟ during the early phase of internationalization. Overall, 
the network theory states that internationalization occurs due to the need for the firm to establish and 
develop positions in relation to counterparts in foreign networks through business and social networks other 
than through internalization. Before entering a foreign market where they have no relevant network, a firm 
suffers from the LOO. With the help of the local network after entering the foreign market, the developing 
country MNEs can obtain more know-how, knowledge and information to serve long-term economic 
objectives (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988; Liefner and Hennemann, 2011). This theory not only studies the 
location specificity, but also pays attention to relational positions in a network. The importance of business 
networks has been highly acknowledged by the IB theories (Rugman and Verke, 2007) and integrated into 
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the new update of the OLI model and the Uppsala model (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 2009). 
Proximities study: The importance of geographical proximity/ distance is one of the key issues in EG. 
Economic geographers have contributed to the literature by putting emphasis on the many advantages of 
being co-located. With the notion of „de-territorialisation of closeness‟ (Bunnell and Coe, 2001), they have 
also pointed out that geographical proximity per se is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
learning to take place. Nevertheless, it facilitates interactive learning, most likely by strengthening the other 
dimensions of proximity, such as organizational, social, institutional and cognitive proximities (Boschma, 
2005). In contrast to the arguments from the psychic distance analysis in the Uppsala model and the 
network theories, geographers claim that proximity may also have negative impacts due to the problem of 
lock-in and overembeddedness (Hess, 2004). Accordingly, not only too little, but also too much proximity 
may be detrimental to interactive learning and innovation. Among the proximities, cognitive 
proximity/distance has the strongest connection with interactive knowledge sharing and learning. Cognitive 
distance is defined as knowledge differences in the knowledge bodies of different actors in networks 
(Nooteboom, 2000). Nooteboom proposed an inverted U-shaped relationship between cognitive distance 
and learning. As the cognitive distance increases, so does the positive effect of resource heterogeneity. It 
thus yields opportunity for novel combinations of complementary resources. However, as the cognitive 
distance increases, the positive effect of resource homogeneity decreases, which hinders the mutual 
understanding and collaboration (Nooteboom et al., 2007; Huber, 2012). The deeper and more thorough 
research of proximity/ distance in the fields of geography and knowledge sharing enables a better 
perspective to understand the geographical distribution of FDI from developing economies and the 
investments of developing country MNEs in developed countries, which involve active knowledge learning 
and are faced with many liabilities and obstacles caused by large cognitive distances. 
The three IB theories and four perspectives from business, social, knowledge management and 
geographical fields are very useful to understand the FDI from China. The institutional theory, the LLL 
model, network theory and cognitive distance study are particularly inspiring to study the FDI from China 
to developed economies where the Chinese MNEs need to learn knowledge and are faced with all kinds of 
obstacles. They are the theoretical foundation of the following articles in this dissertation, where the 
specific reviews and comments about each theory are discussed. 
3 Empirical studies review 
3.1 General FDI from China 
Similarly to theoretical research, most empirical studies on Chinese FDI have been carried out in the IB 
field. Therefore, I will summarize the main publications in this field and then introduce the empirical work 
done by EG scholars, which has high relevance for my research. 
Inspired by the appeals for more empirical research on FDI from China to extend present theorizing 
concerning the FDI theories, two series of workshops have been held since 2008. One was in the USA. The 
workshop “China Goes Global” has been carried out every year, hosted by Harvard University. The other is 
in Europe, namely „Emerging Multinationals: Outward FDI from Emerging and Developing Economies‟, 
held once every two years. The host is the Copenhagen Business School. In addition to these workshops 
and extensive discussion between scholars, several special issues have been published, for example Chinese 
Management Studies, Volume 3 Issue 1 (2009), Thunderbird International Business Review, Volume 54 
Issue 2 (2012) and Journal of World Business, Volume 47 Issue 2 (2012). Several books have been 
published as well (Table 4).  
  
 
Table 4 Books about Chinese outward FDI and Chinese MNEs 
Editor(s)/ Author(s) Book title Type Main contents 
Yang (2005) China‟s Offshore Investments: A Network 
Approach 
Monograph Patterns of China‟s outward FDI, the relevance of network relationships 
and technological configuration to FDI 
Shen and Edwards 
(2006) 
International Human Resource Management in 
Chinese Multinationals 
Edited book The evolution of human resource management in Chinese companies, 
recruitment and selection, rewards and compensation and employee 
relations 
Rajan et al. (2008) New Dimensions of Economic Globalization: 
Surge of Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
from Asia 
Edited book Intra-region FDI in Asia 
Larcon (2008) Chinese Multinationals Edited book Cooperate strategy, internationalization process and innovation 
Ramamurti and 
Singh (2009) 
Emerging Multinationals in Emerging Markets Edited book Business strategies and theory update 
Sauvant (2009) Investing in the United States: Is the US ready 
for FDI from China? 
Edited book Political controversies and legal and business implications associated with 
Chinese investment in the US 
Sauvant et al. 
(2009) 
The Rise of Transnational Corporations from 
Emerging Markets: The Challenges ahead 
Edited book FDI theory update, FDI trend, policy implications 
Alon et al. (2010) China Rules – Globalization and Political 
Transformation 
Edited book Political economy and governance; institutional trade and investment 
patterns; industry cases 
Buckley (2010) Foreign direct investment, China and the World 
Economy 
Edited book FDI theory, FDI history and policy 
Voss (2011) The Determinants of Chinese Outward Direct 
Investment 
Monograph FDI patterns and determinants 
Huang and Austin 
(2011) 
Chinese Investment in Australia: Unique Insights 
from the Mining Industry 
Monograph Entry process, success factors and lessons  
Forns et al. (2012) The China-Latin America Axis: Emerging 
Markets and the Future of Globalisation 
Monograph Investment and business of the main players at both the country/region 
and company levels  
Source: Own draft 
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In general, they can be divided into three types. Firstly, the edited books and reports are mainly about 
FDI from emerging economies, including from China, such as “The Rise of Transnational Corporations 
from Emerging Markets” and the World Investment Report 2006 by UNCTAD entitled “FDI from 
Developing and Transition Economies”. They were typical around 2007, when the research about Chinese 
outward FDI was in its initial stage. The second type consists of edited books concentrating on Chinese 
FDI. These books cover diversified aspects of Chinese investment, such as patterns, motivations, entry 
modes and political influences. They are mainly the fruits of workshops and conferences. The third type 
involves monographs based on doctoral or postdoctoral research. Except for Yang‟s book, most 
monographs have emerged in the past two years. Each of them focuses on one topic (Voss, 2011), on one 
industry (Huang and Austin, 2011) or on one host country or region (Forns et al., 2012). The time series of 
these publications reveal the increasingly focused, solid and deep empirical studies in the IB field. In both 
the articles and the books, the empirical parts mainly concentrate on the following topics (Child and 
Rodrigures, 2005): The specialty of Chinese MNEs and Chinese outward FDI and how it challenges the 
present theories (Deng, 2009; and references therein); 
 The general trend, pattern and location choices of Chinese FDI (Ramasamy et al., 2010; and 
references therein); 
  Motivations, entry mode and business strategies (Cui and Jiang, 2009; and references therein);  
 The role of government and state-owned enterprises (Luo et al., 2010; and references therein); 
 Technology, catching-up process and outward FDI (Li, 2007; and references therein); 
 Liability of foreignness (LOF) (Klossek et al., 2012; and references therein). 
Regarding the host countries, Chinese investment in Africa is undoubtedly the most heated topic, 
including the exploitation of natural resources, government involvement and environmental impact 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009); then investment in Europe and the USA, concerning business safety, 
government involvement, active knowledge absorption, brand establishment, upgrading along the value 
chain and LOF (Zhang and Duysters, 2010); thirdly, the investment in Australia, concerning natural 
resource seeking, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and merger and acquisitions (M&As) (Drysdale and 
Findlay, 2009); finally, the investment in Asia, for example the role of Hong Kong and industrial parks in 
East Asia (Zhou and Lall, 2005). The data falls into three categories: the statistical data from UNCTAD 
(1979 - present), the Almanac of China‟s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and the Statistical 
Bulletin of China's Outward FDI released by the Ministry of Commerce of the People‟s Republic of China 
(MOFCOM) (2003 - present) or from the data of a host county from its statistical database, for example the 
Deutsche Bundesbank provides a series of data about Chinese firms in Germany; commercial data, such as 
Thomson Dealogic, which provides firm-based or project-based data focusing on large-scale M&As; first-
hand data collected by the authors via interviews, questionnaires and case studies. Owing to the small 
number of Chinese MNEs and their reluctance to accept the interviews, the number of data samples is 
mostly less than 20. All in all, the empirical studies on Chinese MNEs and Chinese outward FDI have been 
developed in terms of both quality and quantity, which provides a better foundation for theoretical 
development. Meanwhile, more first-hand firm data and field study is needed for further improvement 
MNEs and globalization are also one of the main issues in the EG discussion (Giese et al., 2011). 
Compared with the research in IB field, the geographers pay less attention to the decision making, 
coordination and human resources management inside the companies. Instead, they carry out works in 
companies‟ location choices, inter-firm linkage and the interaction between firms and the institutional 
environment the firms embedded in on firm level. On region or country level, geographers have interest in 
the interaction between spaces, such as talent flows, products flows and knowledge flows between different 
places. Therefore, the present work of the economic geographers has different focuses from IB scholars. 
Meanwhile, rare books or special issues concerning outward FDI from mainland China has been published, 
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although this topic attracted the interest of many geographers (Yeung and Liu, 2008; and references 
therein). Most work has been implemented under the umbrella of „Chinese business firms‟ which are 
owned or operated by Chinese people, no matter they come from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore or other parts of the world (Smart and Smart, 2000; Yeung and Olds, 2000). To be specific, 
geographers‟ work includes six main streams:  
 Chinese diasporas, the migration of Chinese people and the inter-country knowledge flow (Hsu 
and Saxenian, 2000; and references therein); 
 Chinese diasporas and start-up enterprises in a foreign country (Wong and Hg, 2002; and 
references therein); 
 Family-owned enterprises, Guanxi and their influence on the firms‟ location choice and inter-firm 
network (Lu, 2012; Tan and Yeung, 2000; and references therein); 
 Chinese MNEs and the globalization of R&D (Fan, 2011; and references therein); 
 Entrepreneurship and the internationalization of Chinese firms (Yeung, 2009; and references 
therein); 
 Investment in developed economies and technical absorption (Lim, 2008; and references therein). 
Among economic geographers, Henry Yeung has conducted deep and thorough research for twenty 
years based on the empirical evidence of the investment of Hong Kong and Singapore firms in East Asia. 
He has written several frequently cited books regarding the internationalization of Chinese firms, for 
example Transnational Corporations and Business Networks: Hong Kong Firms in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Region (Yeung, 1998), Entrepreneurship and the Internationalization of 
Asian Firms: An Institutional Perspective (Yeung, 2002) and Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards 
Hybrid Capitalism (Yeung, 2003), which analyze in detail the role of business networks, entrepreneurship 
and institutional environment in the internationalization process of Chinese firms. Meanwhile, several 
geographers have also studied the overseas Chinese business network on the empirical basis of Taiwanese 
investment in mainland China (Hsing, 1996) and in the USA (Zhou, 1998). However, they elaborate upon 
different arguments. In contrast to the works on mainland China that support the opinion that Guanxi 
provides resources for Chinese firms to coordinate and control transnational business, Hsu and Saxenian 
(2000) state that the skill and competence required for technological upgrading are not necessarily 
guaranteed within the ethnic network. Although ethnic networks facilitate transnational business and 
technology cross-fertilization, it seemingly goes too far to argue that the USA–Taiwan connection is 
another version of Chinese Guanxi capitalism. Comparing overseas Chinese investment coming from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan to mainland China, Yang (2006, 2007) argues that Hong Kong and Taiwan investments 
have followed different transformation paths with regard to sector composition, investment motivations, 
market orientation, entry modes and strategies in response to institutional changes. All these studies 
discovered the special nature of overseas Chinese enterprises, such as ownership and the management of 
business networks. They also conclude a diversity of Chinese capital, which varies between home and host 
countries. Since outward FDI from mainland China has distinct characteristics compared with others, i.e. 
against the special institutional background of “globalizing China”, a complex phenomenon in which the 
Chinese State is strategically and intricately entangled with the corporate interests of its leading business 
firms, more empirical studies are needed to fill this gap (Yeung and Liu, 2008).  
To conclude, most empirical research by geographers is based on first-hand data, with the assistance 
of second-hand data, i.e. statistical data or archive material. The field study takes half a year or longer. 
Therefore, their empirical studies are solid. Moreover, they study not only Chinese MNEs, but also small 
and medium-sized enterprises run by overseas Chinese. They have a historical tradition of describing the 
interaction between firms and the institutional environment, particular the role of the government and 
culture in Chinese business. They attempt to reveal how the human flow, capital flow and goods flow link 
Summary: Literature Review and Self-evaluation  
10 
 
China with other parts of the world. The focus on the relationship between firm and country is one of their 
competitive advantages compared with IB scholars. 
3.2 FDI from China to Germany 
Although Europe has received a relatively small amount of Chinese FDI, Chinese FDI has attracted the 
attention of managers and policy-makers in Europe for its recent landmark cross-border M&As (Clegg and 
Voss, 2011). Given that the research on Chinese outward FDI is still in its initial stage, there has been 
limited empirical research focusing on Europe. The present empirical findings indicate that investment is 
highly related to knowledge acquisition and learning. Based on a case study of Chery Automobile Co. Ltd, 
a Chinese company that is attempting to catch up technologically via acquisitions in Europe, Zhang et al. 
(2012) demonstrate that the internationalization of Chinese firms is a process in which they gradually 
integrate strategic alliances. Strategic alliances and acquisitions help Chinese firms enhance their 
internationalization competence. Minin and Zhang (2010) found evidence of the growing tendency of 
Chinese companies to engage in less explorative and more exploitative R&D activity, adapting 
technologies developed elsewhere for the European market, gaining access to good indigenous labor and 
technologies. Moreover, Chinese firms are facing more difficulties in Europe than in other regions because 
of many factors. For example, the trade between China and Europe is relatively low, there is less 
experience with respect to Europe, and there are a relatively large number of deals related to state owned 
enterprises, which makes a deal sensitive (Ebbers and Zhang, 2010). Research on England and Italy shows 
similar results to the research on Europe in general. Liu and Tian (2008) examine the patterns of and the 
motives for Chinese enterprises investing in the UK based on questionnaires collected from 20 companies. 
They conclude that Chinese firms investing in developed countries are driven by the attractions of large 
markets and asset augmentation, and problems of psychic distance can be offset by the benefits from such 
investment activities. Pietrobelli et al. (2011) investigate the motivations driving Chinese outward direct 
investment to Italy based on 9 in-depth interviews with key informants and senior managers of Chinese 
affiliates in Italy. They claim that Chinese investments in Italy are increasingly targeting the acquisition of 
technological capabilities and of design skills and brands to tap local competences available in specialized 
manufacturing clusters in sectors such as automobiles and home appliances. The main industries of 
specialization of Chinese outward FDI in Italy reflect this approach and appear to be related to China‟s 
strategy to increase the sophistication of its exports and to move away from standardized commodities and 
intermediate manufacturing and components. 
We now turn to examining the literature on Chinese investment in Germany. Knoerich (2010) 
analyzed 5 Chinese acquisitions of German firms in the machinery and equipment industry. His paper 
shows that German firms can gain substantially from the global ambitions of the Chinese firms for 
advancement of their own business objectives. This is due to complementarities in the motivations for 
engaging in the deals, as well as the underlying strategic needs of both firms. In the context of emerging 
economy enterprises acquiring advanced economy firms, motivations on both sides of the acquisitions 
appear to go beyond the commonly known goals such as capital transfer and additional market access, as 
the acquisitions provide the companies involved with conditions favorable to expansion into previously 
inaccessible market segments. Liu and Woywode (2012) used in-depth interviews with 5 Chinese 
companies in Germany to discover the influence of absorptive capacity on the post-M&A operation. They 
found out that a light-touch approach, which maintains the domestic management team and provides 
decision-making autonomy, enables the success of subsidiaries. Klossek et al. (2012) present insights from 
31 semi-structured face-to-face interviews with employees belonging to 7 Chinese MNEs and stakeholders 
and find that Chinese MNE subsidiaries‟ strategies to reduce their LOF depend on the establishment mode 
chosen: the subsidiaries established via acquisition are more likely to use due diligence, sharing control 
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with the local management and sharing work with local forces, whereas those established via greenfield 
prefer installing key employee roles.  
To conclude, current discussion has been of a rather general and conceptual character, with very 
limited empirical investigation. Most of the above-mentioned research focuses on four aspects: general 
trend and pattern of Chinese investment, motivation of Chinese enterprises, LOF, and M&As as well as 
managerial and cultural integration after M&As. They are explorative and involve qualitative research with 
around 20 interviews or less than 10 case studies. Given that the current work has mainly been done by IB 
scholars, the inter-firm linkage and the geographical perspective are missing. More empirical works are 
needed if people wish to understand the Chinese investment in Germany and to modify the theories based 
on them. 
4 Own work and contribution 
Against this theoretical and empirical background, I started the research on FDI from China in 2009. This 
PhD dissertation consists of four papers. The first two papers state the historical development and 
geographical distribution of Chinese outward FDI based on the archival documents and statistical data. 
They were written before the field study as an initial step towards understanding the general characteristics 
of Chinese outward FDI. The latter two papers were finished after the field study, which focuses on the 
specific behavior of Chinese MNEs in Germany. Since this field study provides unique first-hand data for 
my dissertation and is also an important part of my empirical work, I will briefly introduce the general 
information of the field study in this section. I will then summarize the main contents and results of the four 
papers, the theoretical and empirical contribution, and further research. 
4.1 Research design and methodology: Field study 
A qualitative approach has advantages for discovering how and why things happen when the area of 
research is in this infant period and the researcher is engaged in theory-building types of research (Ghauri 
and Hronhaug, 2005). It has been widely applied in the empirical research on Chinese outward FDI, as 
illustrated in the literature review section. Therefore, I have chosen two qualitative data collection methods 
- overt participant observation and interviews - as the methods of carrying out field study from April 2011 
to February 2012.  
Overt participant observation was implemented with the state of Hesse as a major supporting 
institution. I collected information from formal events within the local Chinese community, such as “Focus 
on China- Frankfurt/Rhine/Main (FRM) inviting you”, “China in Dialogue” and “China Talent Day”. 
Secondly, I held informal talks with the participants during free time, such as lunch or dinner, drinking and 
sports time. I then referred to the above-mentioned local publications and gray materials. The extensive 
participant observation allowed me access to informal discussions and interchanges, and provided inductive 
understanding of actors‟ perceptions. 
Interviews were conducted in three steps. Firstly, I interviewed 19 experts or key persons in 
government and public organizations to gain an initial impression of Chinese MNEs in Germany. I then 
approached the Chinese MNEs. I held 19 interviews with general managers or other members of the 
management group. Finally, I held 18 interviews with associations, parent firms, local partners or 
customers and service corporations to gather their comments on Chinese firms‟ behavior. Each interview 
lasted 2 hours and 45 minutes. For detailed information on the research region, sample characters and the 
way I arranged and carried out interviews, please refer to article 3 (Page 60). 
I designed the interview guidelines as questionnaires with specific options. When carrying out 
interviews, I asked open questions and ticked off the options after I received the answers from interviewees, 
followed by the successful experience or failure in detail. If I received answers that went beyond the 
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questionnaire, I added these as one of the options in the following interviews. I assumed that the answers 
that interviewees gave were the most important factors in their minds. This method is used to avoid the 
subjective bias when designing questionnaires with definite options.  
There were two sets of interview guidelines (Referring to the appendix 1). One was used in expert 
interviews in steps 1 and 3 to evaluate the role of the expert and organizations in the process of Chinese 
investment in Germany and to learn their attitude to Chinese firms as the third party. The expert interview 
had four parts in total. It began with the general information of the expert or the institute in which he or she 
worked. The second part was his or her evaluation of Chinese MNEs in Germany in general, including 
industry, entry modes and successful examples. The third part concerned the establishment of branches, 
such as the motivation, location choice and competitive advantage. The last part was about difficulties and 
firms' contribution to the local and the Chinese economy. 
The other was used in the interviews with Chinese firms in step 2 (Referring to the appendix 2). The 
firm interview guideline was very similar to the expert interview, but the questions about the firm were 
more specific and detailed. It began with the general information of the firm, including the year of 
establishment, ownership, industry, function, entry model, employees and brief introduction of the 
interviewee (mostly managers). The second part concerned the establishment of branches, such as the 
motivation, location choice and competitive advantage. It was followed by the business operation after the 
cross-border investment, for example local embeddedness and knowledge acquisition channels and 
objectives. The last part was about difficulties in Germany and cooperation and communication with 
headquarters in China. The two kinds of interview guidelines are attached as appendixes in this dissertation 
(Appendix 1 and 2). 
When writing articles, I cite the information from the interviews directly as the evidence for testing the 
existing theories and supporting our arguments. This kind of direct citation and description has been used 
widely in EG research (Yeung, 1998; and references therein). 
Table 5 compares my database with other empirical research from the EG and IB fields. Most 
geographers have started their research on mainland Chinese MNEs in the last 5 years. Therefore, their 
research is mainly based on official statistics and case studies. The research on Chinese investment in 
Europe, on the other hand, is mainly conducted by IB scholars on the basis of firm interviews. 
In contrast, my research is based on statistics, reports, local newspapers and 56 interviews not only 
with firms, but also with other players such as officers and local partners. The triangle data set could 
provide more sound evidence for understanding the Chinese firms in Germany. 
4.2 Outline and publication status of articles 
This section presents the main content of articles 1 to 4. The topic, theoretical foundation, main empirical 
issues, publication status of each articles and my contribution to them are also summarized in Table 6. The 
table also shows each article‟s connection with two main issues in the introduction section (page 1) and 
theoretical review section (Page 2-6). 
  
 
Table 5 Data source comparison between IB, EG literature and my articles 
EG literature IB literature My papers 
Authors Host regions Data Authors Host regions Data Article Data 
Yeung and liu (2008) - 20 Interviews Liu and Tian (2008) England 20 questionnaires 1 Statistics and 1 case study 
Lim (2008) Korea CCPIT data/ 2 Case 
studies 
Pietrobellia et al. (2011) Italy 9 interviews 2 CCPIT reports and 1 case 
study 
Brienen et al. (2010) Europe Statistics Knoerich (2010) Germany 5 interviews 3 56 interviews with 
government office, firm 
manager and other experts 
Fan (2011) - 2 Case studies Liu and Woywode 
(2012) 
Germany 5 interviews 4 
Klossek et al. (2012) Germany 31 interviews 
Note: CCPIT is short for the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade; - means no data 
Table 6 Overview of individual papers and own contribution 
Art
icle 
Topic Focus 
Theoretical foundation 
Main empirical issues Publication status 
Own 
Contribution 
IB theory Other theory I T E C 
1 History  Temporal data IDP theory Institution  In what way are regulations important for 
FDI in different periods? 
Accepted by 
Journal of Contemporary 
China 
     
2 Geographica
l distribution 
Geographical 
distribution 
and spatial 
division 
OLI model LLL model  Do Chinese MNEs have different motives 
when investing in developed economies 
and in developing economies? 
 What is the logic of Chinese MNEs? 
Published in 
Chinese Geographical Science 
    
 
3 Difficulty In Germany Uppsala 
model 
Network, 
proximity 
 What causes obstacles for Chinese firms in 
Germany? 
Accepted with major revision 
Tijdschrift voor economische 
en sociale geografie 
  
 
 
4 Motivation 
and 
difficulty 
In Germany Uppsala 
model 
Proximity  What causes cognitive distance? 
 The dynamic changes of cognitive 
distance? 
Accepted with major revision 
Eurasian Geography and 
Economy 
    
Note: I is short for introduction, T for theoretical part, E for empirical part, C for conclusion.  means that I did all of the work and  means that I did half of the work.
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Article 1 The Development of Outward FDI Regulation and the Internationalization of Chinese 
Firms In this article, I trace the historical development of Chinese outward FDI and its co-evolution with 
the FDI regulation. According to the statistical data and the change of the Chinese government‟s attitude 
towards outward FDI, I divide the history into four phases - Phase 1 (1978-1991): Standardization of the 
approval procedure; Phase 2 (1992-1998): Tightening of the approval procedure; Phase 3 (1999-2005): 
From approval to supervision; Phase 4 (2006-present): Supervision and providing service - and illustrate 
the policy, FDI characteristics and company behavior in each phase. In this article, I manage to answer the 
following question: in what way are regulations important for FDI in different periods? Theoretically, I 
prove that the FDI development of China still follows the IDP model; however, the Chinese government 
has accelerated the whole process through active regulation reform. In a transition economy such as China, 
FDI co-evolves with regulation changes, and the firms which are able to influence or foresee the policy 
changes can prosper considerably. Chinese outward FDI provides sound evidence on how important 
institutions are in explaining the behavior of Chinese MNEs as foreground factors rather than in the 
background. 
Article 2 Foreign Direct Investment with Chinese Characteristics: A Middle Path Between the 
Ownership-Location-Internalization Model and the Linkage-Leverage-Learning Model This article 
intends to investigate the geographical image of FDI from China based on the comparison between Chinese 
outward FDI to developed economies and that to developing economies. Here, I review the pros and cons 
of two important theories, known as the OLI model and the LLL model, and use the statistical data and 
company case studies from China to test the plausibility of these two models. I believe that neither of them 
are totally suitable: the OLI model is quite useful for understanding FDI from China to developing 
economies, while the LLL model is more powerful for explaining the FDI to developed economies. I argue 
that the companies from China attain a very advantageous position as intermediates in the global economy. 
They may catch up with the first movers if they integrate OLI-led and LLL-led FDI within one firm. This 
combination can bring together the most advanced knowledge acquired in developed economies with the 
knowledge about adaptation needs and the needs for cost reduction in production as expressed in 
developing economies. It may also accelerate the knowledge transfer globally. 
Article 3 Cognitive distance and obstacles to subsidiary business success - the experience of 
Chinese companies in Germany From this article on, I shift my attention from the general image 
description to the stream of FDI to developed economies. I take Germany as an example. In contrast to the 
information from the mass media which claim the success of Chinese outward FDI, I find during the field 
study that Chinese firms in Germany are faced with considerable difficulties. The survival of Chinese firms 
is critically dependent on managing the differences in the knowledge bodies of the two regions, which is a 
general internationalization process involving knowledge learning. In contrast to network and proximity 
theories which emphasize efforts of subsidiaries to overcome obstacles via local embeddedess and 
absorbing local resources, this article shows that a fast and successful process of becoming embedded in the 
host region can hamper the subsidiary‟s success, as it may cause conflict with the parent firm. My line of 
thought is based on applying the perspective of the company. While most other related studies in EG 
primarily examine regions or regionally confined networks, I place the firm in the center of focus. For the 
research question posed here, this is indeed a promising angle and complements the existing literature. 
Article 4 Emerging cognitive distance within and between firms: Conceptual remarks and an 
application to Chinese foreign direct investment in Germany This article is an extension of article 3. It 
focuses on the cognitive distance concept, which offers a powerful tool for understanding the motivation 
and difficulties of Chinese firms in Germany. Cognitive distance is also an important concept in the 
proximity discussion of EG scholars which is still underdeveloped. Based on qualitative information, this 
paper discusses factors contributing to cognitive distances between firms in China and in Germany, such as 
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language or institutional and market differences, and shows that FDI is made to serve as a way of reducing 
or bridging this cognitive distance. Our research unpacks the concept of global pipelines for knowledge 
sharing in a local-global context and explores the great difficulties to be overcome for such pipelines to 
transfer knowledge. 
4.3 Origin, policy suggestions and further research 
This dissertation contributes to the small but growing body of literature on the internationalization of 
Chinese companies and their knowledge learning and overcoming LOFs in developed countries. I 
systematically study the following issues concerned Chinese MNEs: 
 The general development of China‟s Outward FDI  
 The historical development of Chinese outward FDI and the role of government in this 
history 
 The geographical distribution of Chinese outward FDI and the motivations of Chinese 
investment 
 The Chinese investment in Germany  
 The motivation of Chinese investment in Germany 
 The difficulties of Chinese firms to survive in Germany 
This research may contribute to the theoretical development in the IB field. It introduces the 
geographical perspective into IB studies (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Firstly, it has been proved that the 
regulation evolution in China has not changed the general trend of FDI development as IDP theory 
indicates, however it changes the tempo-spatial distribution of Chinese outward FDI. When the Chinese 
government had strong control over outward FDI before 1998, developed economies were more important 
destinations; however, more FDI flowed to developing economies when the Chinese government began to 
encourage outward FDI later. The high influence of regulation on location choice has been missing from 
the traditional IB field. Secondly, neither the OLI model nor the LLL model fully explains the Chinese FDI. 
This research reveals the effect of the host country on firms‟ location choice and behavior. Thirdly, the 
concept of cognitive distance is a dynamic inter-firm relationship concept widely applicable in internal and 
external network studies, which is also deeply related to country-level institutional factors. This research 
proves that it provides a better framework than psychic distance from the Uppsala model for evaluating the 
evolution of an MNE in the internationalization process, the institutional interaction between the host 
country and the home country via communication, as well as coordination inside MNEs. Therefore, more 
work needs to been done to integrate the geographical perspective into FDI research.  
This dissertation may contribute to EG development as well. It suggests that the combination of 
investment to developing and developed economies may allow Chinese firms to combine the most 
advanced knowledge acquired in developed markets with the knowledge about adaption needs and the need 
for cost reduction in production as expressed in developing countries. With this strategy, Chinese MNEs 
can function as a shortcut for the otherwise long path that a new idea takes from its first use in expensive 
and innovative products in developed economies to its final application in a much more basic and cheap 
product in developing countries. This will not only provide companies with dynamically evolving business 
opportunities, but may also shorten the time span that innovative companies in developed economies need 
to exploit their ideas economically. Therefore, this study unpacks the possibility of Chinese firms 
functioning as a global pipeline between China, developed and developing economies. Based on the 
empirical study in Germany, it provides evidence of how a global pipeline could be founded and 
implemented by bridging and reducing the cognitive distance along the pipeline. I also argue that if the 
cognitive distance cannot be effectively overcome, a dysfunctional pipeline can impede the success of the 
investment made, which can be bad for the subsidiary, its host regions and clusters, and can have negative 
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effects for the investing firm as a whole, therefore limiting the positive impact of the investment on the host 
region. The firm perspective from IB theories thus offers a complementary view that may contradict what 
geographers find with an examination of regions and network linkages only. 
Empirically, this dissertation could increase the understanding of Chinese MNEs. For Chinese firms, it 
is very important to monitor the regulation changes in China and the host countries. The changeable policy 
and regulation in China as well as the political and cultural barriers from host countries could lead to both 
great opportunities and political risks. Therefore, Chinese firms need to monitor and adapt to the 
institutions and institutional changes efficiently and effectively. It is also essential for Chinese firms to 
realize the LOFs despite the great attractiveness for business before investing in developed economies.  
This paper can bring policy suggestions as well. For Chinese officers, they need to accept that a 
healthy business environment in China is important to nurture top world MNEs in the long term. The 
internationalization of Chinese firms will cause institutional changes in China in the future as well. For host 
country governments, particularly from developed economies, a friendly business environment and talents 
who are familiar with both China and western knowledge will attract more investments from China. 
As this study has been an initial attempt to understand FDI from China, future research could 
investigate different directions. 
 Deeper research on actors of local networks in Germany, i.e. the comparison between Chinese 
MNEs and the small startups run by overseas Chinese; the role of the German government and 
producer services in the location choices and internationalization process of Chinese MNEs; 
 Deeper research on the types of linkages in local networks, i.e. which kind of linkage is more 
important for knowledge sharing for Chinese firms - interpersonal linkage or business linkage; 
 The globalization of Chinese R&D. Although I have attempted to understand the market and 
technical knowledge learning of Chinese firms in Germany, the interview cases mainly have a 
sales function. Therefore, carrying out thorough case studies on firms with R&D functions, such 
as Huawei, will be my next step to integrate the technological learning of Chinese firms in 
Germany (Zeng et al., 2011). 
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Abstract：The IDP model has been widely accepted for illustrating the relationship between the inward 
and outward FDI positions of a country and its economic status based on the data from developed 
economies. In recent years, however, outward FDI from developing economies has increased dramatically 
and it has been argued that institutions are “forefront” factors in addition to the economic index. In this 
article, we use statistical data from China, which has gone through dramatic regulation reform and FDI 
development, to test the validity of the IDP model. We also trace the history of Chinese FDI regulation 
development to answer the following question: in what way are regulations important for FDI in different 
periods? We use Lenovo as a case study to show how a Chinese firm “avoids” and “adapts to” regulation 
changes. We find that the FDI development of China still follows the IDP model; however, the Chinese 
government has accelerated the whole process through active regulation reform. In a transition economy 
such as China, FDI co-evolves with regulation changes, and the firms which can influence or foresee the 
policy changes can prosper considerably. 
Key words: Institution; Outward FDI; Regulation; History 
 
1 Introduction 
What aspects of the home country affect the characteristics of FDI and the behavior of MNEs over time? In 
the 1990s, Dunning proposed the IDP theory based on developed country data. This theory argues that the 
inward and outward FDI positions of a country are systematically related to a country‟s level of economic 
development. According to the IDP model, outward FDI is expected to be undertaken only when a country 
has reached a certain minimum level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the firms has gained the 
ownership advantage (Dunning, 1993). However, Dunning‟s theory has been questioned, since the research 
expanded the geographical scope from developed economies to developing economies. The outward FDI 
from developing economies emerged earlier and increased more dynamically than that from developed 
ones (UNCTAD, 2007). Can Dunning‟s theory still explain the dynamics of outward FDI from developing 
economies which are institutionally different from the developed ones? What kind of role do the factors 
beyond economic development play, such as institutions which were treated as an exogenous environment 
for the MNEs and often faded into the “background” in Western mainstream research? 
In the last ten years, researchers have argued that institutions need to be brought to the “forefront” 
(Porta et al., 1999), because they directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to 
formulate and implement strategies and to create competitive advantages (Peng et al., 2008). Institutions 
theory could be one of the three pillars - the other two being the more established industry and resource-
based views - that study the FDI from developing countries in order to establish a new framework. The 
issue of how the institutions are important has been pushed to the cutting edge in the theoretical discussion 
(Peng, 2006). Dunning and Lundan (2008) introduced the work of Douglass North on institutions and 
examined how an institutional dimension could be incorporated into the eclectic paradigm. Cantwell et al. 
(2010) combined the institutions with evolutionary views and developed a theoretical framework to link 
historical changes in the characteristics of MNE activities to changes in the institutional environment. 
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However, more empirical studies are needed, especially about the interplay between the FDI and the 
institutions of developing economies as home countries. 
China is a good case for describing “how institutions are important for outward FDI”. China, as a very 
important transition economy, has endeavored to pursue great institutional changes and high-speed outward 
FDI development. In 2010, China was the 5
th
 largest source of FDI, with 68 billion US dollars in outbound 
flows (UNCTAD, 2011). The Chinese government plays a highly prominent role in nurturing and fostering 
MNEs, for example a high number of SOEs are the main players in the cross-border investment, the 
establishment of large sovereign wealth funds (Thomas and Chen, 2011) and the government-led quest for 
natural resources (Zhao, 2008). Institutional aspects cannot be ignored if one hopes to understand Chinese 
outward FDI (Sauvant, 2005; Wei, 2002; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Therefore, we attempt to test 
whether the IDP model still makes sense for explaining the development of Chinese outward FDI, and how 
changing institutions interact with the aggregate characteristics of FDI and the individual behavior of 
Chinese MNEs. Since institutions can be broadly generalized into two types - formal rules (constitutions, 
laws and regulation) and informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct) 
- and the informal institutions of a large country such as China in particular, are difficult to evaluate, we 
focus on outward FDI regulation at the country level. 
The article is structured as follows: we begin by reviewing the theories regarding institutions and their 
relationship with MNEs; we then trace Chinese FDI history, dividing it into several periods, and discuss 
how regulations interact with the overall trend of FDI in each period; in the third section, we will reveal 
how a Chinese MNE behaves in the changing institutional environment based on a case study of Lenovo 
Group Limited (Lenovo for short); finally, we present the conclusion and a discussion. 
2 Theoretical review: Institutions and MNEs 
Institutions are formally defined as the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction (North, 
1990). Economic actions are embedded in the institutional environment, and the institutional environment 
surrounding organizations affects organizations‟ behavior and decisions in a positive or negative way while 
the institutions can also change, potentially influenced by organizations (Scott, 2001; Boschma and 
Frenken, 2009).  
The institution theories originated in the social sciences and were later applied in the business, 
economic and geography fields (Oliver, 1997). The early studies on adopting an institutional perspective in 
MNEs and FDI research mainly focus on the influence of the institutional environment on the MNEs, 
although some of this research may not have appeared under an institutional label (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). As mentioned previously, there are two kinds of institutions, and the related research can also be 
divided into two types. Regarding formal institutions, some authors examined the ways in which national-
level laws and regulations of host countries condition the strategies and entry modes of MNEs (Henisz, 
2003; Meyer et al., 2009). As for the informal institutions, some authors have explored the ways in which 
MNE affiliates seek to gain legitimacy and are influenced by the normative and cultural cognitive 
institutions (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Peng, 2003). Most of the latter research comes under the umbrella of 
research on the psychic distance and the Uppsala model. Psychic distance is defined as factors preventing 
or disturbing firms‟ learning about and understanding of a foreign environment, such as language, cultural 
differences and so on (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 2009). The Uppsala model combines the perception of 
foreignness in host countries with an evolutionary learning perspective. It assumes that firms firstly gain 
experience from the domestic market before they move to foreign markets; firms start their foreign 
operations in close countries in terms of psychic distance and move gradually to more distant countries 
(Johanson and Finn, 1975). Although the Uppsala model has been criticized for its time-dependent 
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processes and deterministic evolutionary paths (Forsgren, 2002), it is still one of the important theories for 
understanding institutional factors and MNEs‟ spatial expansion in different development stages.  
The issue of how MNEs react to the institutions and institutional changes has attracted increasing 
attention recently. Oliver identified five strategic responses of an MNE to the institutional environment, 
which range from passive action to active resistance, namely acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance and manipulation (Oliver, 1991). Cantwell et al. (2010) combine an institutional view with the 
evolutionary theory to understand FDI behaviors through a more dynamic view. According to them, there 
are three kinds of interaction between the institutions and MNEs. The first is institutional avoidance, in 
which MNEs take the external institutional environment as a given, but in which they are able to make 
choices between different institutional environments. This can serve as another explanation about the issue 
of why a firm carries out investments outside its home country and has location preferences for host 
countries (Witt and Lewin, 2007). The second is institutional adaptation. Here, MNEs treat the institutional 
environment as essentially exogenous, but in this case they seek to adjust their own structure to fit the 
environment better. MNEs may use political influence and bribery (Doh et al., 2004). They may realize 
their legitimacy through isomorphism (Kostova, 1999), imitation, learning and post-entry changes related 
to entry modes. In contrast to the first two cases, the third one is institutional co-evolution, in which the 
institutional environment is assumed to be partly endogenous; the MNEs‟ objective is no longer simply to 
adjust, but to affect changes of the local institutions. MNEs might actively seek to shape the „„rules of the 
game‟‟ in their favor and to engage in political activities in order to advance specific kinds of regulations or 
market structure, such as adopting broad diversity policies, corporate governance laws and divergence of 
governance practices (Bigley et al., 2005; Oxelheima and Randøy, 2003; Khanna et al., 2006). This 
behavior provides the firm with an advantage over their competitors. Dynamic environments such as China 
are likely both to allow and to require innovation and a continuous co-evolution for a firm to sustain a 
competitive advantage. The two studies mentioned above view the institutions and MNEs as related and 
integrally connected, and provide sound theoretical support for understanding the interaction between them. 
However, the existing empirical studies are mostly concerned with the institutional difference between the 
developed economies as home countries and the developing economies as host countries, or about how 
Western MNEs adjust their behavior, bargain with the host countries or influence the market functions 
there (Eden and Molot, 2002). Emerging economies, where profound institutional transformations are 
taking place over time and which are becoming increasingly important sources of FDI, could offer an 
excellent contrast to the existing research; however, the FDI and MNEs from these economies and related 
institutions are largely ignored (Wan, 2005). More empirical research is needed to fill this gap and to 
deepen the theoretical understanding of the relationship between FDI and institutions from an evolutionary 
perspective. 
Since the outward FDI from China is a new phenomenon which has been a hot topic for less than ten 
years, there is still limited empirical research about Chinese outward FDI and institutions. The existing 
studies focus on two points. One is an evaluation of the influence of regulations on MNEs, most of which is 
related to the historical discussion. Wu and Chen outline the historical development of China‟s outward 
FDI by examining the firms‟ motivations, industries and geographical distribution. They notice that the 
motives for Chinese outward FDI shift from being driven by political motives in the early stages to market-
seeking and asset-exploitation later (Wu and Chen, 2001). Ge and Ding (2009) argue that China‟s 
institutions in general offer a favorable environment for internationalization. Chinese firms gravitate toward 
strategies that take advantage of these opportunities, and they examine the effect of government, industry 
and corporate level on the strategic choices of Chinese MNEs. Voss et al. (2009) assess the evolution of the 
institutional actors and environment that have shaped Chinese FDI. They divide the history since 1978 into 
five distinctive phases according to China‟s political and regulatory environment concerning FDI. The 
other point relates to the validity of psychic distance, but with differing opinions. Li argues that the MNEs 
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from East Asia as latecomers are less likely to adopt „psychic distance‟ since they need to obtain advanced 
technologies as well as strategic partners from developed countries (Li, 2003). Liu and Tan examine the 
patterns of and the motives for Chinese enterprises investing in the UK and argue that Chinese firms 
investing in developed countries are driven by the attractions of large markets and asset augmentation and 
problems of psychic distance can be offset by the benefits from such investment activities (Liu and Tian, 
2008). In contrast, Buckley et al. use the panel data from China to test the connection between FDI and 
institutions, and find that the cultural proximity, host country membership of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and geographical distance are important determinants. However, the empirical research about the 
interaction between Chinese MNEs and institutions is sparse (Buckley et al., 2007). 
3 The history of Chinese outward FDI 
In this section, we trace the history of Chinese FDI focusing on two aspects. One is the evolution of 
evolution, including the importance of FDI regulation in the macroeconomic policy framework, the main 
attitude of FDI regulation, representative policies and measures. The other is the development of FDI and 
Chinese MNEs, including industrial and geographical distributions of outward FDI and representative 
MNEs. This history started in 1978, when China‟s Reform and Opening up policy was announced (Asia 
Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC) and CCPIT, 2005; Wua, 1998). 
We collected the related data from the following sources: the inward and outward FDI flow data from 
the UNCTAD database; the other economic data from the World Bank; detailed information about the 
industrial and geographical distribution of Chinese FDI from MOFCOM and CCPIT; the policy 
information from the website and reports of the Chinese authorities which are related to FDI management 
in China, i.e. the State Council (SC), MOFCOM, the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People's Republic of China 
(SAFE), the People‟s Bank of China (PBC), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
which was called the State Planning Commission (SPC) before 1998; and finally several academic research 
and reports. 
3.1 Brief history of Chinese outward FDI (1978- Present) 
According to the IDP model, countries initially draw in increasing amounts of FDI and subsequently 
become outward investors as their per capita income rises (Dunning et al., 2008). Figure 1 depicts a 
freehand drawing of the relationship between GDP per capita and the net outward FDI, which is defined as 
the difference between gross outward investment and gross inward investment, of the IDP model and its 
comparison with the data from China. As GDP per capita in China increased every year, the horizontal axis 
also indicates the years from 1978 to 2010. 
The first stage was from 1978 to 1991. In this stage, there was very little inward and outward FDI, 
with the annual flow amounting to less than 5 billion US dollars. In the second stage, which started in 1992 
and ended in 2005, inward FDI emerged and amounted to 61 billion US dollars per year, while outward 
FDI remained low and only accounted for around 10 per cent of the inward FDI. From 2006, the growth of 
outward FDI was faster than that of inward FDI, thus signaling the start of the third stage begun. Now, the 
outward FDI flow is still less than the inward flow and China is still in the third stage of IDP. This 
trajectory is also consistent with the regulation changes, with the exception of stage 2. During this stage, 
the Chinese government‟s attitude towards outward FDI changed, with the turning point in 1999. Before 
1999, the Chinese government was very cautious about FDI approval. In 1999 China began its “Go Global” 
policy and subsequently changed its regulation from an approval to a supervision process. It was a 
landmark reform in the history of Chinese outward FDI. Hence, we have divided the second stage into two 
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parts: from 1992 to 1998 and from 1999 to 2005. We will illustrate the four phases in detail in the 
following sections. 
 
Data source: UNCTAD http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx 
Figure 1 The comparison between the IDP model and Chinese inward and outward FDI 
3.2 Phase 1 (1978-1991): Standardization of the approval procedure 
This was when China began to establish previously non-existent regulation regarding outward FDI. Before 
this period, China had been an economically closed country with little involvement in the global economy. 
The introduction of the reform and opening policy in 1978 was the formal beginning of the Chinese 
government‟s initiative to encourage Chinese firms to expand internationally through FDI (Fetscherin et al., 
2010). But any overseas projects, regardless of their size, needed to be examined and approved by the SC 
as the only authority (Zhang, 2003). There was no formal policy until 1984, when MOFCOM issued the 
“Circular Concerning the Approval Authorities and Principles for Opening Non-trade Joint Venture 
Overseas as well as in Hong Kong and Macao”. The regulation system transformed from case-by-case 
approval to the gradual standardization of the procedure through authorities besides the SC, such as 
MOFCOM, SAFE, PBC, SPC and SASAC. The Chinese government could then control the amount, 
destination and industrial distribution of outward FDI easily. In 1991, the NDRC announced the “Opinion 
of the State Planning Commission on the Strengthening of the Administration of Overseas Investment 
Projects” (often shortened to the Opinion 1991). As this policy was issued at the end of the period and had 
more influence during the next period, we will discuss this in the following subsection. During this stage, 
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the Chinese government valued inward FDI over outward FDI, since it was attempting to avoid 
„unnecessary‟ outflow of hard currency and also to accumulate foreign exchange earnings (Moore, 1996). 
Four categories of overseas projects which could secure access to domestically scarce natural resources, 
access and transfer technology, enhance export possibilities, or augment managerial skills could be 
successfully approved. The outward FDI shared similar strategic aims with inward FDI. 
The annual amount of outward FDI flow was small - below 1 billion US dollars. The firms which 
carried out the outbound investments lacked competitive advantage in the global economy. They were 
mostly SOEs, covering industries such as shipping, trading services, mining and restaurants. Most FDI 
went to economically-developed countries rich in natural resources, such as Canada and Australia, with 
joint ventures as a favorite entry mode. This was due to the attempt to import technology, management 
skills and natural resources into China and to serve the domestic market, while not having the knowledge 
and experience to survive independently in developed countries (CCPIT, 2010). Typical MNEs included 
Sinotrans Limited specializing in international freight forwarding, air cargo and international express 
delivery, China Metals and Minerals Import and Export Corporation (MINMETALS) as a major import and 
export channel for metals and minerals, and China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), 
which was set up by the former vice president of China Mr. Yiren Rong in 1979. CITIC invested in the 
USA in 1980 and acquired the Celgar pulp mill in Canada in 1986. 
3.3 Phase 2 (1992-1998): Tightening of the approval procedure 
In this phase, inward FDI remained more important than outward FDI for China, and the Chinese 
government was more cautious and rigorous about the approval of outward FDI, due to the Asian Crisis 
and a surge of state asset losses in Hong Kong real estate and stock market speculation (Wong and Chan, 
2003). As mentioned preciously, the Opinion 1991 claimed that Chinese firms did not have the abilities and 
conditions to carry out large-scale overseas investment. This was effective throughout the 1990s 
(Fetscherin et al., 2010). In 1993, the SAFE issued the Examination and Approval Standards on Foreign 
Exchange Risk and Fund Source Examinations for Outbound Investment. Proposals that involved overseas 
investment of more than 1 million US dollars had to be examined by SAFE before referring them to 
MOFCOM for final approval and it could take sixty days for the regulative agencies to give an answer 
(Woo and Zhang, 2005). The approval procedure became more complicated and time-consuming in this 
phase, particularly for large-scale investment. 
At the beginning of this period, outward FDI increased at a similar speed to inward FDI, and surged to 
4 billion US dollars in 1992 and 4.4 billion US dollars in 1993. It was slowed down by the tightened 
approval procedure and fluctuated around 2 billion US dollars afterwards. The majority of the MNEs 
remained SOEs, which were in the business service, logistic and natural resource industries. The developed 
economies were still the important destinations. However, two new phenomena appeared. One was that 
green field investment became an important entry mode alongside joint venture. The other was that some 
private manufacturers became overseas investors during this period (MOFCOM et al., 2009). For example, 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. (Huawei for short), a telecommunications equipment provider, began to 
establish overseas branches in 1996; Haier Group (Haier for short), a white domestic appliances 
manufacturer specializing in refrigerators, did so in 1998; Galanz Enterprise Group Co. of Guangdong 
(Galanz for short), another white domestic appliances manufacturer specializing in microwave ovens, 
started in 1998. Although the overseas investment by these companies was on a small scale and did not 
attract too much attention, these companies were the most successful companies in their field inside China 
and had the entrepreneurship and motives to make themselves an international brand. 
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3.4 Phase 3 (1999-2005): From approval to supervision 
Phase 3 was the official beginning of the “Go Global” policy, which provided a strong public endorsement 
for an institutional environment that fostered outbound investment. This period was characterized as the 
most comprehensive opening-up period after China entered the WTO, which evaluated outward FDI higher 
than inward FDI. Over the whole period, regulations were reformed gradually from approval to supervision. 
Most of the important policies that had had significant influence in the third and fourth phases were 
implemented in this period. In 1999, the SC issued the “Circular on Simplifying the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation over Processing and Assembling Business with Self-bringing Materials Conducted Overseas”. 
The government encouraged enterprises to engage in processing cross-border trade. Enterprises producing 
light industrial goods such as textiles, machinery and electrical equipment were specifically encouraged to 
establish overseas manufacturing projects that could process Chinese raw materials or assemble Chinese-
made parts that could eventually spur China‟s exports. In 2001, the “Go Global” policy was officially 
written into the 10th Five Year Plan, which was the key guideline for Chinese development. In 2004, the 
SC issued a landmark document, the “Decision on Reforming Investment System”, to replace the Opinion 
1991. It made sure that firms were the main actors that could invest overseas without the approval of the 
government. Instead, they simply needed to keep a record with the government. They were no longer 
required to deposit security at SAFE and were allowed to raise money in international finance markets to 
help fund outward FDI activity (Wong and Chan, 2003). Besides procedure changes, the government 
loosened foreign exchange control and granted financing support as well. In 2005, SAFE issued the 
“Circular on Expanding the Trial Regions for the Pilot Program Concerning Overseas Investment” to give 
more rights to the local SAFE offices concerning foreign exchange (Yu and Hwang, 2005). In the same 
year, The NDRC released the “Circular on the Issues of Offering More Financing Support to Key Overseas 
Investment Projects”. It provided the preferential treatment for investment projects in R&D and M&A. 
Under this flexible regulation, outward FDI fluctuated around 5 billion US dollars and manufacturing 
became increasingly important. At the end of this period, manufacturing sectors made up 18.6% of the 
capital and 34.7% of firms (National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China (NBS), 2006). 
M&A amounted to 6.5 billion US dollars and more than a half of the outbound flow in 2005. M&A became 
one of the three important entry modes besides joint venture and green field investment. As for the 
geographical distribution, developing economies grew to be the preferred location for FDI. In 2005, 52.6% 
of the outbound flow went to Latin America and 35.6% went to Asia, while less than 10% flowed to 
developed economies. Some private firms from the electronics industry in particular became very active in 
FDI, although SOEs remained the main investors. For example, there was TCL Corporation (TCL for 
short), which produced consumer electronics, mobile communications and home appliances. TCL was 
established in 1981 and started its rapid international expansion in this period. TCL acquired Schneider 
from Germany in 2001, a phone branch of Alcatel from France and a Go-Video Corporation from the US in 
2003, and Thomson Electronics from France in 2004. This over-expansion brought TCL into the news 
headlines; but brought a deficit for years as well. Its over-expansion was to some extent due to the policy 
support and over-optimistic attitude from the home country. Since manufacturing industries joined the 
overseas expansion in this period, more FDI flowed into developing economies than to developed 
economies after that. This was the starting point of the geographical distribution changes. 
3.5 Phase 4 (2006-Present): Supervision and providing service 
Phase 4 was the successive extension of the last phase. In 2006, SAFE issued the “Circular on Revision of 
Certain Foreign Control Policies Relating to Overseas Investments to Lift Restrictions on the Amount of 
Foreign Exchange Annually Available to Domestic Investors‟ Outbound Investments” (Stender et al., 
2006), and the “Regulation of the People‟s Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration”. 
MOFCOM released detailed information about the regulation and removed the barriers as well. What is 
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more, the government attempted to provide comprehensive service and support, such as providing 
information and guidance
1
, reducing investment risks, and so on. Following the trial period, encouraging 
outward FDI has been more important than attracting inward FDI for the government, since China has one 
of the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world. 
Outward FDI increased dramatically, from 10 billion US dollars in 2006 to around 70 billion US 
dollars in 2011. The industrial and geographical composition was similar to that of the last period. SOEs 
are still the main actors, while the increase of limited liability companies and listed corporations is also 
very obvious, which accounted for 8% of the total in 2009. The entry modes remain diversified, with the 
preference for M&A for large investment. Some MNEs which started internationalization early, such as 
Huawei, Lenovo, CITIC and MINMETALS, have grown strong and experienced, and have made good 
names for themselves in the global market. Meanwhile, some newcomers from the automobile and other 
manufacturing industries, such as Zhejiang Geely Holding Group, Sany Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. and 
Fuxing Group, have become active in M&A and green field investment as well. 
Figure 2 shows the history of Chinese outward FDI in the last 30 years in China, which has developed 
from being policy-oriented to being firm-oriented. During these years, the government explored ways to 
establish a regulation system. At first, the government was the ruler and directly determined which firms in 
which industries could invest overseas. As China became a part of the global economy, Chinese regulation 
gained more experience in the process, and the government moved to loosen its control, letting the firms 
make the decision and influencing and serving outbound investment increasingly indirectly. Chinese MNEs 
grew large and strong in the process. At first, only the logistic, trading service and mining industries 
invested overseas to serve the trading and import of raw materials. Since the announcement of the “Go 
Global” policy and China‟s entry into the WTO, manufacturing has also grown into one of the main 
industries with global players. The entry modes have become diversified too. Initially, most of the 
investment was carried out by joint ventures and then through green field investment as well; now, a high 
portion of M&As has become one characteristic of Chinese outbound investment. 
                                                          
1For more information see the website of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, http://fec.MOFCOM.gov.cn/ 
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Source: own draft 
Figure 2 Historical developments of Chinese FDI and regulations 
This history also illustrates the interaction and co-evolution between Chinese regulation and MNEs‟ 
aggregate characteristics. Chinese firms needed to make their strategic choices over time to adapt to the 
changing regulation. Meanwhile, the government attempted to monitor the aggregate trend of Chinese 
MNEs and FDI, therefore issuing economically friendly policies to serve the state better. They interacted 
with each other and created the economic boom in China (Table 1). 
Table 1 Examples of the co-evolution between regulation and FDI development 
 
Source: own draft 
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In phase 1, China was economically closed, the firms were small and the government had no related 
regulation experience. The government had significant control over the outward FDI through approval 
procedures. It encouraged some SOEs to carry out overseas investment to absorb knowledge and natural 
resources. These SOEs followed the order and accumulated large amounts of capital through trade. At the 
same time, they also lost assets in Hong Kong due to their lack of experience. This led to the Opinion 1991 
at the end of the period and the government‟s screening and tightening of control over the overseas 
investment in the second phase. 
In phase 2, many investments were stopped or slowed down by the government. At the same time, 
some round-tripping FDI emerged due to the policy of favoring inward FDI and foreign investors 
(UNCTAD, 2007). Some firms, established branches, holding companies in particular, in Hong Kong and 
some tax havens and then invested funds back into China to reap the benefit as foreign investors. By the 
end of this period, some domestic brands had attempted to establish overseas branches, sales and trading 
service to explore the global markets. This kind of trial was small and not on the radar of the government. 
Phase 3 was the turning point, when the government‟s attitude changed from caution to 
encouragement. Firstly, the government adjusted the policies according to the development of firms in the 
last phase. 30 consumer electronics firms and 20 firms from other main export sectors were selected by 
MOFCOM to receive priority state assistance to invest abroad (Friedrich and Han, 2002). The related 
authorities then removed the barriers to let the Chinese MNEs carry out FDI fast and more easily. During 
this phase, Lenovo, TCL, Haier and other firms were highly active in M&As in the global market. 2004 
was even named the Chinese M&A year. This led to the announcement of the financial support for M&A 
projects in 2005. 
In phase 4, M&A has been the preferred entry mode because of the government support for the 
acquisition of technology, knowledge and management skill. The effect of government on firms is 
increasingly indirect. For the SOEs, their success depends on the ongoing SOE reform which claims to 
realize a “state-owned but business run” environment and to establish a modern management system. For 
private firms, outbound investment has been made easier down and they have been able to make wise 
strategic moves. 
All in all, outward FDI regulation and the growth and cross-border expansion of the Chinese 
companies are historically interconnected with each other. The evolution of regulations is one of the factors 
that form the distinctive characteristics of Chinese companies, i.e. developed economies were preferred in 
the early stage, which was different from the psychic distance model, and there was a high portion of 
M&As as an entry mode despite their high failure rate. At the same time, the behavior and new trial of the 
leading firms has also attracted the attention of the government, and the government has adjusted the new 
policies to provide efficient supervision and help.  
4 Case study: Lenovo 
In this section, we use Lenovo as a case study to illustrate how a single MNE behaves in a changeable 
institutional environment. Lenovo, which is the second largest vendor of personal computers in the world, 
is regarded as an outstanding Chinese MNE and its success is highly related to its internationalization and 
to some extent to its understanding of Chinese policies, as well as to convenient timing. We discuss what 
the firm did in different periods of the history of Chinese outward FDI and describe the organizational 
expansion which it followed. 
4.1 Phase 1: The establishment of Lenovo Hong Kong 
During phase 1 (1978- 1991), Lenovo started in 1981 as a reseller/distributor of foreign computer firms 
such as AST Research, Inc. (AST for short), International Business Machines Corporation (IBM for short) 
Article 1 The Development of Outward FDI Regulation   Si, 2014 
31 
 
and the Hewlett-Packard company (HP for short). Since it received products through the Hong Kong 
traders who were able to control the marketing channels, Lenovo could only make a small profit. 
Meanwhile, it created the Legend Chinese-character Card (LCC) which had a low technological level but 
was essential for the Chinese market. Although this card won the highest National Science-Technology 
Progress Award in China, the designing and selling of it did not bring Lenovo high profits. Before 
expanding overseas, Lenovo did not have the advantage as a beginner, but formed the capabilities to 
combine market, manufacturing and technology resources. 
The foundation of Lenovo Hong Kong in 1988 was a milestone for Lenovo. Lenovo Hong Kong was 
founded as a joint venture together with Digital China Holdings Ltd, which focused on distribution and 
service of personal computers (PCs), especially PCs from AST and Legend Capital, one of China‟s leading 
corporate venture capital investors, which provided access to bank loans. This joint venture brought 
Lenovo more trading channels, greater financial possibilities and easier access to technology in Hong Kong. 
From then on, Lenovo sold computers with its LCC in the mainland, which brought about 15% higher 
profits. In 1990, the very first Legend PC was launched in the Chinese market and experienced great 
success. 
Lenovo was extremely successful as a trader in the closed Chinese market, and was one of the private 
firms which carried out FDI in the first phase. This early move brought great benefit to Lenovo in the 
second phase. On the other hand, Lenovo argued with the government about the importance of a Chinese 
domestic brand, and attempted to establish its own name as a national brand.  
4.2 Phase 2: Listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1994 and becoming a domestic 
brand 
During this phase, the Chinese government was very conscious about outward FDI, while at the same time 
welcoming inward FDI. In 1994, Lenovo Hong Kong was listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and 
collected a huge amount of money from its initial public offering (IPO). With this huge financial support, it 
entered the multi-product period. Lenovo introduced the first server in 1996 and the first laptop in 1996 and 
a pioneering Internet PC in 1999. Each time, Lenovo modified the products for the demands of the Chinese 
market. 
The key to Lenovo‟s success in this period lay in its overseas expansion and knowledge about Chinese 
institutions. Lenovo Hong Kong earned a large amount of money using the concept of mainland China and 
the well developed financial market in Hong Kong. In mainland China, Lenovo received a tax benefit as a 
foreign company and made a name for itself among customers as a national brand. Lenovo achieved better 
sales than its competitors and developed a good reputation in mainland China.  
4.3 Phases 3 and 4: M&A and the path to becoming an international company 
After 1999, the Chinese government was increasingly positive about outward FDI, and M&As in particular. 
Lenovo began to negotiate with IBM in 2002. With the capital collected in the Hong Kong financial market, 
Lenovo acquired IBM‟s PC department in 2004 for approximately 1.75 billion US dollars. The deal not 
only enabled Lenovo to acquire IBM‟s laptop production lines, product developers and distribution 
networks, but also provided Lenovo with IBM‟s brand. Lenovo retained IBM‟s customers and employees 
and gained management skills in running a large foreign business as well. Hence, Lenovo‟s targeted market 
expanded from China both to developed economies such as Canada, Japan, the USA and the European 
Union (EU), as well as to developing economies such as ASEAN, India and some countries in Africa. This 
deal was reported by the Chinese and US media and made Lenovo known around the world. Lenovo was 
on the way from being a domestic brand to becoming an international brand. Growing into a global player 
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was also consistent with Chinese government policy. However, its financial operation was all conduct 
outside mainland China, mainly in Hong Kong, to escape foreign exchange control in mainland China. 
The M&As of Lenovo did not stop there. In 2011, Lenovo formed a PC joint venture with Japanese 
PC maker NEC, which was registered in the Netherlands. Lenovo then bought German electronics retailer 
Medion, which specialized in sales of low-cost computers and electronic devices. This helped Lenovo open 
German and even European markets to compete better with competitors such as Dell and HP. Through 
M&As, Lenovo gained technology, an international brand and a sales channel. 
The story of Lenovo shows how a firm takes advantage of the institutions. Lenovo is a PC maker 
which did not pursue the highest technology, but rather the most suitable technology for the market, 
because it was familiar with the Chinese market and Chinese culture. Lenovo acted differently in different 
policy periods. In phase 1, Lenovo was an institution avoider. It established the joint venture in Hong Kong 
and carried out round-trip investment in mainland China as a foreign enterprise, because it wanted to 
escape from the bad situation as a private company in mainland China. At the same time, it co-evolved with 
the regulations. Lenovo persuaded the Chinese government of the importance of being a national brand and 
won some support for domestic PC producers. It also received a chance to face strong competitors from 
developed economies in the domestic market. In the phase 2, Lenovo was an institution adapter. The IPO of 
Lenovo Hong Kong help it obtain the channels with components suppliers and banks, which allowed it to 
produce its own brand of computer later. The round-trip investment was very rational for Chinese firms. In 
phase 3, the acquisition of IBM‟s PC division gained Lenovo a worldwide name, high technology and 
market channels around the world. Without this M&A, Lenovo‟s rapid overseas expansion would probably 
have been impossible. Now, Lenovo has achieved the successful move onto the global stage and with 
global resources. 
5 Conclusion and discussion 
Our research demonstrates that the Chinese outward FDI can to some extent be explained by the IDP model. 
China has now been through the first stage of IDP (1978-1991) with limited inward and outward FDI, the 
second stage (1992-2005) with large amounts of inward FDI and limited outward FDI, and the third stage 
(2006-present) in which outward FDI has increased faster than inward FDI. It proves the argument again 
that the development of FDI is highly related to the economic status of a country.  
Although the active and appropriate government involvement did not change the general trend of the 
FDI development, it highly influenced the characteristics of each stage. The institutions and institutional 
changes grant Chinese outward FDI some special characters which could not fully be explained by the IDP 
model. 
First of all, Chinese outward FDI emerged in phase 1, before the firms had gained an ownership 
advantage; most of the FDI was carried out by the SOEs and went to developed economies. This 
phenomenon reveals that the outward FDI shared the same strategic motives with China‟s effort to attract 
inward FDI. It was driven by technology seeking, management knowledge seeking and natural resource 
seeking. It also brought mainland China capital. The four big Chinese SOEs in Hong Kong, namely China 
Merchants Group, China Resource, China Everbright Group and China National Travel Service (HK) 
Group Corporation, earned foreign exchanges to support the economic development in mainland China 
during phase 1. These firms were established even earlier than the FDI from the USA and the European 
Union to China. The active participation of the Chinese central government and SOEs provides another 
possibility for the start of the IDP. 
Secondly, the Chinese government and its regulations enhanced the stage‟s behavior in China. In 
phase 2, Chinese inward FDI increased dramatically, while Chinese outward FDI remained stable at a small 
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amount. The tightening of the control over outward FDI directly eliminated the possibility of outward FDI 
growth. In contrast, the encouragement of cross-border investment in phases 3 and 4 provided incentive for 
the high-speed increase of outward FDI. The changes from one stage to another stage in China were less 
smooth than those of the IDP.  
Thirdly, the development of Chinese outward FDI was stimulated by China‟s regulation reform, which 
moved from a negative attitude to a positive attitude; from being political objective-centered to being firm 
interest-oriented; and from direct control to indirect influence. It included the trade regulation and SOE 
reform as well as the evolution of outward FDI regulation. The role of the government and formal 
institutional environment, however, was not a part of the IDP model, which was established based on 
experience in the market economy.  
All three points prove the importance of institutions theory for explaining Chinese outward FDI 
development. The government is as important as firms in the economic and outward FDI development 
process in a transaction economy. The institutions and FDI grow alongside. The institutions theory needs to 
be incorporated into the IDP model to explain the FDI from emerging economies. 
Our research shows the co-evolution of the FDI regulation and aggregate characteristics of MNEs. It 
offers some evidence for answering the questions concerning the reasons behind Chinese outward FDI 
growth and the role of the Chinese government in this process. It also contributes to the development of 
other FDI theories besides the IDP model. The Lenovo story shows that the firms which can influence or 
foresee the policy changes can achieve great commercial success in China. The high flexibility and quick 
action regarding institutional changes are a competitive advantage for Chinese firms in terms of survival on 
the global stage, particularly in Africa and other developing countries. It is a supplement to ownership 
advantage in Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm. We also show that the Uppsala model and the psychic distance 
concept do not work well for the aggregate characteristics of FDI from China, while it fits somehow with 
individual behavior. This uncovers two shortcomings of this kind of research: ignoring the changeable 
government attitude and institutional environment in the home country and overlooking other functions of 
overseas branches other than a market explanation. The desire to acquire knowledge could drive the 
outward FDI to overlook the difficulties of greater psychic distance at the government level (in phase 1) 
and at the firm level (Lenovo‟s acquisition of the PC department of IBM in the USA). More work could be 
done to evaluate how psychic distance works in the different stages of the IDP model.   
This paper is an initial exploration into the interaction between formal institutions and FDI. 
Nevertheless, the informal institutions, such as culture, cognation and social network, are as important as 
formal ones. As the importance of the Chinese government in the development of outward FDI is fading, 
how informal institutions work and how MNEs behave to adapt to the unfamiliar host counties will be 
another interesting topic for the future. How these MNEs‟ behavior influences the formal and informal 
institutional environment in their globalization process would also be of great interest and significance. 
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Abstract: The MNEs traditionally originate from developed countries. In the last ten years, however, there 
has been dramatic growth in FDI from China. It is a comparatively new phenomenon that challenges the 
classic FDI theories. In this paper, we review the pros and cons of two important theories, known as the 
OLI model and LLL model, and use the statistical data and company case studies from China to test the 
plausibility of these two models. We believe that neither of them suits totally: the OLI model is quite useful 
for understanding FDI from China to developing economies, while the LLL model is more powerful for 
explaining the FDI to developed economies. We argue that the companies from China attain a very 
advantageous position as intermediates in the global economy. They may catch up with the first movers if 
they integrate OLI-led and LLL-led FDI within one firm. This combination can bring together the most 
advanced knowledge acquired in developed economies with the knowledge about adaptation needs and the 
needs for cost reduction in production as expressed in developing economies. It may also accelerate the 
knowledge transfer globally. We thus fill a gap in research into the geographical pattern of Chinese FDI 
and offer a deeper understanding of the internationalization of Chinese MNEs and revolving knowledge 
transfer. 
Keywords: Outward FDI; OLI model; LLL model; China 
 
1 Introduction 
Since entering the WTO, China has shown dramatic growth in outward FDI. It became the fifth largest 
source of FDI in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011). Besides the large amount, FDI from China has two distinctive 
characteristics compared with FDI from developed countries. Firstly, a large number of MNEs which are 
active in FDI lack competitive advantages in technology and management. Moreover, these MNEs invest 
on a relatively large scale not only in developing, but also in developed economies, which share little 
similarity as host countries (Liu and Tian, 2008). It is a comparatively new phenomenon that has great 
influence in the global economy and it also challenges the classic theories which are based on the 
observation of MNEs from developed economies (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
To date, the existing research on China′s outward FDI has paid more attention to the Chinese 
investment in developed economies (Deng, 2009). Liu and Tian (2008) carried out 20 surveys to examine 
the patterns of and the motives for Chinese enterprises investing in the United Kingdom. Klossek et al. 
(2012) presented insights from 31 semi-structured face-to-face interviews with employees belonging to 
seven Chinese MNEs and stakeholders in Germany to draw conclusions about Chinese MNEs′ 
establishment modes and strategies. There is also some research about FDI to Africa (Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2009) or to East and Southeast Asia (Kang and Jiang, 2012). According to these studies, the FDI in 
developed economies mainly seeks strategic assets, while that in developing economies mostly goes after 
the natural resources and low labor costs. Besides motivation, these two kinds of FDI have different 
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industrial and functional compositions as well (Sutherland, 2009). Functional composition includes 
manufacturing facilities, R&D and distribution. However, these studies only collect a small number of 
samples and there are few descriptions about the general spatial image of FDI from China or about the 
comparison and contrast between FDI from China to these two different kinds of host countries because of 
limited access to data (Schueler-Zhou and Schueler, 2009). 
Hence, this paper intends to use case studies to investigate the general image of FDI from China based 
on the comparison between China′s outward FDI to developed economies and China′s outward FDI to 
developing economies. Two issues will be addressed: 1) Do Chinese MNEs have different motives when 
investing in developed economies and in developing economies? 2) What is the logic of Chinese MNEs 
carrying out direct investment in other countries and regions? 
In this paper, the terms country/economy refer to territories or areas; the designations employed and 
the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of 
any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or 
boundaries. The major country/economy groupings follow the classification of the UNCTAD. Developed 
countries/economies: the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (other than Chile, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Turkey), plus the new EU 
member countries which are not OECD members (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and 
Romania), plus Andorra, Bermuda, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. Developing 
countries/economies: in general all economies not specified above. For statistical purposes, the data for 
China refers the data from the mainland of China, exclude those for Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) Model 
In order to answer questions how and why Chinese MNEs invest abroad, we need to review the related FDI 
theories. The mainstream perspective in international business, based on the experience of MNEs from 
developed economies, assumes that companies will internationalize on the basis of a definable competitive 
advantage that allows them to secure enough return to cover the additional costs and risks associated with 
operating abroad (Buckley and Ghauri, 1999). The eclectic paradigm developed by Dunning draws together 
elements of previous theories to identify OLI advantages that motivate internationalization (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). However, there are so many differences between FDI from developing economies and FDI 
from developed ones that the mainstream theory is only partly suitable. The OLI model has been modified 
by pointing out the unique or distinctive advantages and motives accrued by MNEs from developing 
economies (Table 1). 
Table 1 Differences between original and modified OLI models 
Criterion OLI model Modified OLI model 
Ownership 
advantages 
Firm-specific advantages, 
superior proprietary resources or 
managerial capabilities 
Initially mainly country-specific advantages, 
later becoming more firm-specific advantages 
Internalization 
advantages 
Asset exploiting Asset exploiting and asset augmentation 
Location 
advantages 
Access & use of local natural or 
labor resources and markets 
Access & use of local resources, markets, 
capabilities & institutions 
Source: Own draft 
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Firstly, several authors discovered some comparative ownership advantages of MNEs from 
developing economies (Dunning et al., 2008). Initially, these companies have mainly country-specific 
advantages stemming from access to home country resources or special cultures such as social networks 
and relationships. Based on these country-specific advantages, MNEs from developing economies may 
become specialized among value chains and attain firm-specific advantages such as techniques in special 
niches and management (UNCTAD, 2007). Secondly, the internationalization strategies of MNEs are not 
only asset exploiting but also asset augmenting. Asset augmenting means that MNEs venture into 
international markets in order to acquire strategically created assets such as technology, brands, distribution 
networks, R&D facilities and managerial competences to offset their shortcomings (Kuemmerle, 1999). 
Therefore, the locations with the strategic assets, such as the USA, the EU and Japan, are also attractive 
destinations for FDI from developing economies.  
The modified OLI model can, to some extent, explain why companies from developing economies 
carry out cross-border business, and it is also a good framework for comparing these MNEs with traditional 
ones. However, this framework is still a comparatively static observation, comparing one point in time with 
another (Mathews, 2006a). It gives the impression that there is no inter-connection between its various 
constituent parts (Dunning, 1993). It also ignores the improvement of MNEs in the process of 
internationalization.  
There have only been few surveys evaluating the application of the modified OLI model in China. In 
2005, the Foreign Investment Advisory Service carried out interviews with 150 Chinese MNEs regarding 
their motivations, drivers and competencies. It reveals that a focus on production process is the main 
advantage source for Chinese MNEs. It also suggests a powerful motivation for strategic asset seeked by 
Chinese MNEs, especially in industries in which they face intense competitive pressures (UNCTAD, 2007). 
It is a pity that the survey ignores the comparison between FDI to developed economies and that to 
developing economies. 
2.2 Linkage-Leverage-Learning (LLL) Model 
Latecomer theory attempts to answer the question how latecomer firms challenge established positions in 
the global economy (Mathews, 2006a). The theory is guided by the idea of turning the disadvantage of 
latecomers into a source of advantages. It is also highly related to knowledge absorption theory, which 
argues that technologically backward companies can substantially upgrade their knowledge base through 
active knowledge absorption and learning (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Latecomer theory is effective in 
explaining the catching-up of Asian companies in the 1990s, and also contributes to the theoretical 
development of the FDI from this area. Among all the models, the LLL model is one of the most plausible. 
According to LLL, there are three steps for knowledge acquisition of latecomer firms: linkage, 
leverage and learning. 1) Globalization multiplies the opportunities for latecomers to link up with the 
existing network, to draw themselves into circuits of exchange and sources of advantage. 2) Access to new 
knowledge is turned into leverage opportunities as soon as this new resource is strategically used to 
upgrade and diversify the recipient company's product portfolio. 3) The success of the recipient firm 
depends on the integration of the newly acquired knowledge into the company′s existing knowledge 
portfolio, i.e. on learning. Through learning, the company increases its technological capabilities and thus 
accesses new opportunities for repeated linkage, leverage and learning in other, higher value-added market 
segments (Mathews, 2002; 2006a; 2006b). 
Latecomers will attach the highest importance to ensuring that national firms become global players 
through an emphasis on outward FDI as well as on inward FDI. While inward FDI can be used to promote 
linkages within the domestic economy, outward FDI is a way of building linkages with the global economy 
(Mathews, 2006a). Accordingly, outward FDI is undertaken by latecomer firms to facilitate technological 
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access due to the fact that they are constrained by assimilation capabilities and policy distortion in their 
home countries. 
The LLL model describes successfully how a company enhances its control over essential resources. It 
contributes in two important ways to the understanding of latecomers′ internationalization. The first is 
active knowledge absorption, which emphasizes the activity of technology-seeking latecomer firms. The 
model argues that companies lagging behind technologically can substantially upgrade their knowledge 
base through active knowledge absorption (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Secondly, it discovers that 
learning represents the capability of latecomers to capture, control and use the resources via active 
knowledge absorption. 
2.3 Comparison between Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) Model and Linkage-
Leverage-Learning (LLL) Model 
There are more differences than similarities between the LLL model and the modified OLI model (Table 2). 
Firstly, the LLL model stems from a resource-based view with the fundamental assumption that the 
competitive advantage of a firm lies primarily in the application of the bundle of valuable resources at the 
firm′s disposal (Wernerfelt, 1984), while the OLI model belongs to asset theory, which assumes that 
competitive advantage stems from ownership. Secondly, the OLI model also assumes that hierarchy and 
market are two main kinds of activities of MNEs. For new MNEs, there is the third choice in addition to 
hierarchy and market: network. The extent to which these new forms of organization present a fundamental 
challenge to the OLI model has been the subject of recent debate (Narula, 2006). In contrast, the LLL 
model was developed quite late and incorporates the global network into its framework. Thirdly, the LLL 
model stresses the key role of knowledge absorption and learning in the process of catching up for 
latecomer companies. It shares similarity with modified points of the OLI model, but we are not sure 
whether the LLL model overestimates the power of knowledge absorption. The notion that the 
internationalization of latecomer firms is motivated by achieving knowledge absorption is still uncertain. 
Last but not least, the LLL model describes the cumulative development process of firms, while the 
modified OLI model remains a static observation. 
Table 2 Comparison between OLI and LLL frameworks 
Criterion Modified OLI LLL 
Resources utilized  Proprietary resources Resources accessed through linkage with 
external firms 
Geographic scope  Locations established as part of 
vertically integrated whole 
Locations tapped as part of international 
network 
Make or buy?  Bias towards operations 
internalized across national borders 
Bias towards operations created through 
external linkage 
Learning  Not part of OLI framework  Learning through repetition of linkage and 
leverage 
Process of 
internationalization: 
Not part of OLI framework Proceeds incrementally through linkage 
Driving paradigm  Transaction cost economics Capturing of latecomer advantages 
Time frame  Comparative static observations, 
comparing one point in time with 
another 
Cumulative development process 
Source: Mathews, 2006a 
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China has been very active in both inward and outward FDI in the last twenty years. Some work has 
been done to track the relationship between inward FDI, knowledge absorption and catching-up in China 
(Buckley et al., 2004; Liefner et al., 2012). As FDI from China is a relatively new phenomenon and more 
advanced in the sense that it entails a commitment to manage and organize operations located outside 
China (Child and Rodrigues, 2005), only few empirical studies have been carried out. We will thus use the 
case studies from China later to check the fitting parts of the modified OLI and LLL models, as mentioned 
in Table 2, and then attempt to derive an explanation for FDI from China. 
We have also noticed that a lot of other theoretical and empirical work has been done to renew the FDI 
theories, such as from the institutional perspective (Li and Meyer, 2009) and the social network and 
cultural perspective (Yeung, 1999). However, these theories attempt to explain how and why MNEs from 
developing economies engaged in outward FDI earlier than traditional companies. Each theory focuses on 
special factors. As this paper concentrates only on how and why China invests overseas, we will not discuss 
these theories in detail. 
3 Methods and Materials 
3.1 Methods: Case studies and location quotient analysis 
A case study is a useful method when the area of research is relatively unknown and the researcher is 
engaged in theory-building types of research (Ghauri, 2005). In this article, we will use this method to test 
the validity of the OLI and LLL models and to understand the general logic of Chinese companies when 
investing globally. Sany Group (Sany for short) was chosen because it is a private manufacturer founded in 
1989 with an internationalizing history of only ten years. As a typical Chinese MNE, it provides a new 
example of rapid internationalization (Mathews, 2006a). 
Location quotient (LQ) analysis is a fundamental and useful tool for determining economic structural 
differences across space. This method will be used here for geographical analysis. It is calculated as shown 
below (Haggett, 1965): 
X
X
X
X
LQ
i
j
ji
ij
,
    
Where LQij is China′s outward FDI to location j in industry i; Xi,j is FDI stock value from China to 
location j in industry i; Xj is total FDI stock value from China to location j; Xi is total FDI stock value from 
China in industry i; X is total FDI stock value from China. 
When LQij < 1, it means China′s outward FDI to location j in industry i is at a less than average level, 
and vice versa. In this paper, location quotient analysis is used to determine the industrial specialization of 
China‟s outward FDI across space. 
3.2 Materials: Personal observation and official database 
Case studies involve data collection from multiple sources (Ghauri, 2005). The main information about 
Sany in section 4.1 was taken from personal observation, such as a verbal report by the vice general 
manager of a German subsidiary in Dusseldorf in 2011 and a face-to-face interview with the public relation 
(PR) manager of the German subsidiary in 2010. Additional information was also collected from gray 
literature, such as corporate reports, website and working papers. 
In the statistical analysis part (sections 4.2 and 4.3), two databases are used. One is the Statistical 
Bulletin of China′s Outbound Direct Investment 2009 (MOFCOM et al., 2010), which released the 
industrial distribution of FDI from the mainland of China to some important economies such as the EU, the 
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USA, Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong and the ASEAN. These databases will be used 
to illustrate the general geographical distribution of FDI from China. The other is the Survey on Current 
Conditions and Intention of Outbound Investment by Chinese Enterprises (SCCIOICE) in 2010, which is a 
questionnaire survey conducted by the CCPIT in collaboration with the European Commission′s 
Directorate-General for Trade and UNCTAD (CCPIT, 2010). It uses the data from the questionnaire survey 
from December 2009 to March 2010. The total of 3000 Chinese firms with experience in import and export 
activities were contacted for the survey, and 1377 firms returned the filled-in questionnaires, 344 of which 
had carried out overseas investment. The completed questionnaires include those from enterprises in nearly 
30 provinces in China and cover various sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, construction and 
financial intermediaries, thus providing good industrial and regional representativeness. The objective of 
SCCIOICE 2010 is to collect in-depth information about the intentions and problems concerning the 
overseas investment of Chinese enterprises. We will use some of the results to show the functional 
distribution and motivation of FDI from China. The two reports are written in both Chinese and English. 
However, detailed information about outward FDI to developed and developing economies separately can 
only be found in the Chinese version. Both two official databases are very valuable, because FDI from 
China is a comparatively new phenomenon, the related statistics, rules and regulations have only been in 
existence since 2003.  
4 Results 
In this section, we will firstly discuss the geographical distribution of Sany, as an example of a Chinese 
MNE, in order to explore the international motivation and dynamics. Secondly, we use the official statistic 
data to analyze the geographical, industrial and functional compositions of FDI from China. Thirdly, we 
compare the different motivation between FDI to developed economies and FDI to developing economies, 
to test whether the Sany case indeed reflects a new reality of business strategy of Chinese MNEs. 
4.1 Spatial structure of a Chinese company: Sany 
Sany had 27 domestic and 30 overseas branches in 2009 (Figure 1). Sany′s manufacturing bases are mainly 
in China. Changsha acts not only as the company headquarters, but also as one of the most important 
manufacturing bases, because it holds location advantages with low-cost and convenient transportation. 
The industrial parks in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenyang and Kunshan have a manufacturing function as well as 
R&D ability. 
Outside China, the sales and service offices are scattered widely, with Hong Kong being the most 
important distribution and sourcing center. Sales and service offices are typical market-seeking investments, 
most of which are located in developing economies. In these economies, competition is not as intensive as 
in developed economies. What is more, Sany branches prefer capital in all host economies, which shows 
their limited knowledge or experience concerning the host countries. Hong Kong is chosen for these 
advantages of efficient access to international markets and global information, and also transportation 
convenience with the mainland of China.  
Sany has four important regional hubs in the world, located in the USA, Germany, India and Brazil. 
Each hub has R&D, manufacturing, sales and service functions. However, there are some differences 
between the subsidiaries in developing and developed economies. Take the Indian and German branches as 
examples: the Indian branch was established in 2002, and Sany India now has a regional R&D center which 
is active in developing products suited to local needs and solving application-related issues using the 
suggestions of major customers. It also owns the biggest overseas manufacturing plant at Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation Chakan, Pune. Sany Germany was established in 2008, 6 years later 
than the Indian branch. It invested 1  10
8
 Euro to build an R&D center and a manufacturing base. This 
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location is a global R&D center which hires local skilled and experienced engineers to design new products. 
It then sends the finished blueprint back to China and produces the components there. Finally, all the 
components are transported to Germany again and assembled there. The products receive the ′Made in 
Germany′ brand and are sold on the European market. Sany India thus has a regional R&D center and 
strong manufacturing ability, while Sany Germany has a global R&D. These functional preferences match 
the location advantages in India and Germany. 
  
 
 
Source: Base map refers to a world map (Scale 1: 108) from National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation, P. R. China 
Figure 1 Spatial distribution of Sany branches 
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In short, Sany puts its main factory bases in China, its global R&D centers in developed economies as 
LLL-led investment, its distribution centers in large and important cities, and its sales and service offices 
all over the world (mainly in developing economies) as OLI-led investment. Neither the OLI nor the LLL 
model alone can explain the Sany′s behavior. The combination of LLL-led and OLI-led investment allows 
Sany to combine the most latest knowledge acquired in developed markets with the knowledge about 
adaption needs and the needs for cost reduction in production as expressed in developing economies. With 
this strategy, Sany can function as a short-cut to transferring knowledge from developed economies to 
developing economies. This will not only provide companies such as Sany with dynamically evolving 
business opportunities, but may also shorten the time span that innovative companies in developed 
economies need to exploit their ideas economically (Figure 2). Besides Sany, several other successful 
Chinese MNEs also show similar geographical patterns, such as Huawei (Ernst, 2006; Fan, 2011) and Haier 
(Li, 2007).  
 
Figure 2 Sany′s strategic approach to foreign investment 
4.2 Similarities and differences between China′s outward FDI to developed and to 
developing economies 
Figure 3 shows the growth of FDI from China as a result of reform and the opening policy of 1978. There 
are clearly three stages in terms of the changes of outward FDI flow. In the first stage, the annual amount of 
outward FDI flow was below 1  10
9
 United States dollars (USD). It surged to 4  10
9
 USD in 1992 and 
fluctuated around this figure after that. Since 2005, the outbound flow has been more than 1  10
10
 USD 
each year, which is the third stage for Chinese outward FDI. 
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Source：UNCTAD, 2011 
Figure 3 Growth of Chinese outward FDI from 1979 to 2010 
When examining the spatial distribution of China′s FDI in the last period (Table 3), it is obvious that 
the portion of developed economies as host countries has grown in the last five years, amounting to 15.8% 
with a total value of 1.09  10
10
 USD in 2010. The amount of FDI flow to developed economies in 2010 
alone was twice that of the total flow in 2004. The developing economies attract a comparatively large ratio 
of FDI from China. Among them, Hong Kong, as the gateway to the mainland of China, is the most 
important destination due to its convenient connection with the mainland of China and its mature financial 
market and business service standards. Legend Holding Ltd, for example, which holds a 25% share of 
Lenovo Group Limited and is active in the acquisition of the PC department of IBM, is registered and listed 
in Hong Kong. Although there is round-tripping FDI between China, Hong Kong and tax havens such as 
the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands (UNCTAD, 2004), the share has decreased since China 
entered the WTO and canceled the special treatment and incentives given to foreign investors (Table 3). If 
these three regions′ share of outward FDI is subtracted, half of the remaining FDI goes to developed 
economies while the other half goes to developing ones. They are all valued as important destinations by 
Chinese MNEs. 
In order to discover the location preference of China′s industries, we have taken four host economies – 
the USA, Russia, the EU and ASEAN, which represent a developed country, a developing country, a 
developed region and a developing region respectively. The four regions are all important destinations for 
China′s FDI. 
  
 
Table 3 Geographical distribution of China′s FDI flows from 2005 to 2010 
Destination 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Amount 
(109USD) 
Percen
t (%) 
Amount 
(109USD) 
Percent 
(%) 
Amount 
(109USD) 
Percent 
(%) 
Amount 
(109USD) 
Percent 
(%) 
Amount 
(109USD) 
Percent 
(%) 
Amount 
(109USD) 
Percent 
(%) 
Total 12.3 –  17.6* –  26.5* –  55.9* –  56.5 –  68.8 – 
To developed 
economies 
0.7 6.0  0.6 3.3  2.7 10.4  2.8 5.0  7.0 12.5  1           10.9 15.8 
To developing 
economies 
11.5 94.0  17.1 96.7  23.8 89.6  53.1 95.0  49.5 87.5  58.0 84.2 
To Hong Kong 0.3 27.9  6.9 39.3  13.7 51.8  38.6 69.1  35.6 63.0  38.5 56.0 
To British 
Virgin and 
Cayman Islands 
6.4 52.1  8.4 47.5  4.5 16.9  3.6 6.5  7.0 12.3  9.6 14.0 
 
Note: *The data of China′s FDI flow (total) are different from the data in Figure 3, because they are from different sources. UNCTAD records the total FDI flow data from China from 1979 to 2010 
(Figure 3), while data from MOFCOM (Table 3) are more detailed including the amounts of FDI in every host country but only from 2003 to 2010.  
Source: MOFCOM et al., 2011 
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We have illustrated the location differences alone, shown in Table 4. The scientific research, service & 
geo-survey and information technology (IT) industries are very prominent in the USA, while scientific 
research, service & geo-survey also show a preference for the EU. This means that there is more 
knowledge-intensive FDI to developed economies. At the same time, capital and labor-intensive industries 
favor developing economies. For example, the LQ index of real estate in Russia and the power industry in 
ASEAN is above 10, and the LQ index of construction in Russia and ASEAN is high as well. 
Table 4 Industrial LQ index in EU, USA, Russia and ASEAN 
 EU USA Russia ASEAN 
Scientific research, service & geo-survey  1.45 5.73 0.34 1.20 
IT 
* 
4.37 
* * 
Real estate  0.64 0.64 14.76 0.28 
Construction  1.01 1.08 2.30 5.11 
Power and other utilities  
* * * 
21.14 
Agriculture,  forestry,  husbandry, fishery  3.76 1.09 29.80 4.36 
Note: * means that the outward FDI stock amount is too small to be listed. 
Source: MOFCOM et al., 2010 
The information about functional composition can only be drawn from the SCCIOICE 2010 (CCPIT, 
2010). In general, the sales function, including sales offices and distribution centers, is the most important 
function. Representatives and agents also make up a significant part. What is more, there are two 
differences between the branches in developed and in developing economies. For one thing, distribution 
centers, which have an important sales function, are more important in developed economies. 
Manufacturing facilities in developing economies are also more significant. To put it simply, a larger 
number of branches in developed economies act in a market function, while a larger number of branches in 
developing economies act in a manufacturing function (Figure 4). 
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Source: CCPIT, 2010 
Figure 4 Functional composition of Chinese overseas branches in 2009 
4.3 Diversified motivations of China′s outward FDI to developed and developing 
economies 
In this section, we will use the results from SCCIOICE 2010 (CCPIT, 2010) to explain the motivations of 
Chinese MNE activities (Figure 5). Of the respondent enterprises that have engaged in overseas investment, 
205 enterprises are involved in the cooperation with product sales, 62 enterprises are involved in the 
cooperation with resources, and 63 enterprises are involved in the cooperation with technical introduction. 
The total of 60% of enterprises hire  less than 200 employees and two-thirds of them invest less than 5  
10
6
 USD abroad. The respondent enterprises share similar scales in terms of the number of employees and 
investment. These are the three categories currently attracting the most overseas investment from Chinese 
enterprises. The great advance of sales cooperation is consistent with the industrial and functional 
composition of Chinese overseas branches, as demonstrated in the previous section, which proves again 
that the overseas investment of Chinese enterprises aims mainly to exploit overseas markets. Capital equity 
cooperation, however, which gives Chinese companies little or no managerial rights, is not an interesting 
choice for them. Figure 5 also reveals two structural differences. In terms of resource exploitation 
cooperation, the enterprises which engaged in overseas investment in developing economies account for 
22%, while the proportion for developed economies is only 10%; in terms of technical introduction 
cooperation, the enterprises to have engaged in overseas investment in developing economies account for 
11%, while the proportion for developed economies is 21%, indicating that Chinese enterprises have 
prioritized the exploitation of local resources in their investment in developing economies, while focusing 
more on introducing advanced technologies in their investment in developed economies. 
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Source: CCPIT, 2010 
Figure 5 Motivation structure of China′s FDI to developed and developing economies 
Table 5 lists the important factors of host countries that influence overseas investment. Market 
potential and natural resources are very important overall. The other factors vary according to destination 
regions. Two factors, i.e., access to advanced technology and R&D and acquisition of established brands, 
are important influencing factors for Chinese overseas branches in developed economies. These companies 
are eager to establish better presences and to shed the negative image of ′Made in China′. What is more, 
access to low-cost labor is only an important factor in developing economies. 
Table 5 Important pull factors of host countries 
 Developed economies  Developing economies  
Important Market potential Market potential 
Access to advanced technology and R&D  Access to natural resources  
Acquisition of established brands  Access to low-cost labor  
Access to natural resources  
Not 
relevant  
Access to international management practices Access to skilled labor resources 
Avoiding transport costs and host preferential 
investment policies  
Access to advanced technology and 
R&D  
 Acquisition of established brands  
Source: CCPIT, 2010 
All in all, the basic pattern and intention of FDI from China shows great similarity with the individual 
firm Sany. Market seeking is the most important motivation, with the sales office function being an 
important functional choice for Chinese companies. This proves that the importance of asset augmenting in 
the modified OLI model and the key role of knowledge in LLL are exaggerated. Asset exploitation is still 
the most important reason for Chinese overseas business, perhaps because Chinese products have their cost 
advantages on the global scale. Efficiency seeking is comparatively important in developing economies, 
and strategic asset seeking is essential in developed economies in particular. These are the reasons why 
more R&D industries and related functions go to developed regions, while manufacturing, construction 
industries and related functions go to developing regions. This also proves the point in the LLL model 
about the reasons why developed economies are also important destinations for China′s outward FDI. 
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5 Discussion 
The modified OLI model and the LLL model can not alone explain the phenomenon and motivation of 
China′s FDI. They each have their own pros and cons. The modified OLI model attempts to form a theory 
which can match both to MNEs from developed economies and to MNEs from developing economies, but 
which ignores some important characteristics of MNEs from developing economies as latecomers, such as 
learning and step-by-step internationalization. From the case study of Sany, we can see that it is more 
suitable for investment in developing economies. In contrast, the LLL model is more meaningful when 
dealing with investment in developed economies. However, the LLL model puts too much focus on the 
learning purpose and foreign MNEs as sources of knowledge, without the analysis on the impact of various 
sources in host countries (Table 6). 
Table 6 Suitable application of modified OLI and LLL frameworks 
Criterion Preference  Content Sany proves  
Resources utilized  Modified 
OLI 
Mainly country-specific, later 
becoming more firm-specific 
Action of branches in 
developing economies 
Make or buy?  Modified 
OLI 
Bias towards operations internalized 
across national borders 
Action of branches in 
developing economies 
Geographic scope  Modified 
OLI 
Locations established as part of 
vertically integrated whole 
Action of branches in 
developing economies 
LLL  Locations tapped as part of 
international network 
Action of branches in 
developed economies 
Learning  LLL Learning achieved through repetition 
of linkage and leverage 
Action of branches in 
developed economies 
Process of 
internationalization 
LLL Proceeds incrementally through 
linkage 
Action of branches in 
developed economies 
Driving paradigm  LLL Capturing of latecomer advantages Action of branches in 
developed economies 
Time frame  LLL Cumulative development process Action of branches in 
developed economies 
Source: Own draft 
The mismatch between the OLI model, the LLL model and the Chinese situation is mainly caused by 
the empirical basis of the two models. The OLI model stems from the observation of American MNEs, 
which focus on the global advantages with technical and managerial experience from domestic markets, 
while the LLL model is based on the empirical studies on MNEs from Korea and Taiwan of China, which 
are actively engaged in global value chains to supply American MNEs and therefore to enter the global 
market. Hence, technical upgrading to meet the demands of American MNEs is essential. However, China 
is different: it has a large and booming domestic market which offers the Chinese MNEs experience 
through exploring the similar market in developing economies, but it does not have the required technology 
to support the MNEs in exploring the developed market. Since China is becoming a more important source 
of FDI globally and the importance of outward FDI for the economic development in China is growing as 
well, a new model based on China′s experience is an important issue in the field of economic geography.  
The Sany is used here to prove that OLI-led and LLL-led behavior is not only found statistically in 
China′s outward FDI pattern, the combination of OLI-led and LLL-led behavior is rather rooted in the 
strategy of Chinese MNEs. It reflects the business approach that is currently the most promising for some 
Chinese MNEs: firms can maintain large-scale and low-cost manufacturing operations at home while 
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exploring the developing market, which shares similarities with the Chinese market, and absorbing the 
knowledge in developed economies to realize sustainable development. To support MNEs in becoming 
global champions, four policies are suggested: encouraging Chinese MNEs to seek knowledge of 
international markets which would accelerate their technical and managerial ability in a short period; 
encouraging indigenous innovation inside China and inside the firms which is necessary for integrating and 
internalizing the newest knowledge acquired in developed economies and developing the new products 
suitable for domestic and foreign markets due to their low cost and high quality; building more transparent 
business institutions with international standards, which is a necessary condition for nurturing leading 
global MNEs; building a better image for China and Chinese firms and overcoming the liability from the 
bias against ′Made in China′. 
6 Conclusion 
Our empirical study has thus also discovered firstly that it may be more meaningful to discuss the 
difference in approaches towards FDI at the firm level rather than at the country level; secondly, that 
destination and motivation combine for FDI, with the motivation of FDI being affected by the attributes of 
host countries; and thirdly, that Chinese companies may accelerate the technology transfer from developed 
economies to developing economies. Some Chinese MNEs have now become large enterprises, but are still 
not strong enough because they can not control the advanced techniques in the highest value-added niches. 
The question whether they will become top MNEs and challenge the existing global networks can not be 
answered by these two models, since learning does not guarantee innovation automatically. It will be an 
interesting topic for discussion in the future.  
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Abstract: The success of FDI from developing countries to developed countries is critically dependent on 
managing the differences in the knowledge bodies of the regions and players involved. The theories that at 
least partly explain successful FDI of this kind use the terms cognitive distance and embeddedness. Most of 
the empirical research takes the perspective of regions and has addressed the problem of becoming 
embedded in the host regions. This paper takes the firm perspective and examines cognitive distance 
regarding not only the host region, but also the knowledge of the firms involved. It uses qualitative 
information from an extensive study of Chinese affiliates in Germany. In contrast to many other studies, this 
paper shows that a fast and successful process of becoming embedded in the host region can hamper the 
subsidiary‟s success, as it may cause conflict with the parent firm. 
Key words: Chinese Outward FDI; Cognitive distance; Germany; interview; Subsidiary; Obstacle 
 
1 Introduction 
FDI used to be the domain of industrialized countries. Throughout the last decade, however, FDI from 
China has been on the increase and is becoming a heated topic in the fields of international business and 
economic geography (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Yeung and Liu, 2008). By 2010, China had invested 
279.6 billion USD, thus being among the top ten largest sources of FDI (UNCTAD, 2012). In contrast to 
FDI from industrialized countries, Chinese outward FDI displays the following characteristics:  
 Government-encouraged FDI: outward FDI receives attention and support from the Chinese 
government, for example in the form of organizational support (e.g. providing lists of potential 
candidates for acquisitions), capital support from state banks and verbal encouragement from the 
government. Altogether, these measures seem to speed up outward investment decisions and some 
companies seem not to be well prepared, which is obvious for those firms that lack established 
brands, qualified people and experience abroad (Luo et al., 2010). 
 Government encouragement not only speeds up investment decisions, but can also lead to an over-
optimistic assessment of business opportunities and reduce the willingness of the top management 
to adapt to the situation found abroad. Hence, government support can influence the decision to 
invest abroad, which is then based neither on the motive of generating profits in the long run nor 
on the experience gained from previous foreign investments. 
 China‟s quest for technology: one of the motives of China‟s outward investment – particularly 
prominent in the manufacturing industry – is to acquire the most advanced technology directly, 
rather than learning it step by step. Consequently, Chinese firms target the technical leaders in 
certain industrialized countries (Buckley et al., 2007). 
Despite the high speed development and huge amount of cross-border investment, more than half of 
Chinese MNEs have not yet become profitable abroad
1
 and they are faced with considerable obstacles 
compared with the MNEs from industrialized countries (Wright et al., 2005). What causes the obstacles, for 
example linguistic barriers and a failure to understand business practices, in host countries? Is this 
particular to Chinese MNEs? Most empirical studies on Chinese MNEs have focused on the role of 
Article 3 Cognitive Distance and Obstacles to Subsidiary Business Success Si, Liefner 
56 
 
government and technology-seeking motivation as mentioned above, while very few empirical 
investigations into the particular obstacles faced by overseas subsidiaries have been carried out (Klossek et 
al., 2012). This important issue, decisive for their success, has been overlooked to date. 
In this article, therefore, we use the example of Chinese FDI in Germany to explore this interesting 
issue and compare it with a prominent model from international business - the internationalization process 
model (Uppsala model). The Uppsala model explains the dynamics of internationalization as follows: the 
most important obstacle to internationalization is lack of knowledge (Carlson, 1966), which can be reduced 
through incremental decision-making and experiential learning in foreign markets. The Uppsala model thus 
provides a framework for analyzing the interaction between obstacles to internationalization and 
knowledge in a firm‟s internationalization process. It is also a dynamic behavior model based on bounded 
rationality, which is suitable for empirical studies (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009).  
However, the Uppsala model states that internationalization is a step-wise process: a firm prefers to 
start in foreign markets that are close to the domestic market in terms of psychic distance, defined as the 
sum of factors that create barriers to understanding the foreign country (language, culture, institutions, etc.). 
It then gradually enters other more distant markets (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977) (cp. next section of this paper). During this process, the investing firm acquires knowledge 
that enables it to manage investment in distant countries at a mature stage of its internationalization process 
and overcome large psychic distance. Based on the empirical findings from Chinese companies in Germany, 
however, we have to challenge this notion of internationalization as a gradual process that involves 
sequential learning. Chinese investment in Germany shares the above-mentioned characteristics that do not 
correspond with the assumption of the Uppsala model. Based on these features, Chinese investment in 
Germany – and other advanced economies – must be characterized as radical rather than stepwise, and it 
cannot build on experience. If Chinese foreign investment were to follow a stepwise approach as assumed 
by the Uppsala model, research into this phenomenon would be unnecessary. 
Hence, it is the aim of this article to illustrate how the Chinese investors‟ radical move to a very 
distant location and market leads to multiple obstacles in Germany, such as difficulties managing public 
relations, a failure to cope with language difficulties, difficulties in hiring local personnel and ineffective 
knowledge sharing with the parent firm. The article uses the concept of cognitive distance to analyze the 
existing knowledge gaps between parent and subsidiary that partly relate to psychic distance (see below).  
The notion of psychic distance, focusing on the impact of differences between places, is too narrow in 
scope if we want to understand the difficulties that Chinese MNEs face. Psychic distance is an obvious 
important point, however, the knowledge of individuals in organizations is also essential, and not simply 
place-specific knowledge. Therefore, we favor the concept of cognitive distance, defined as the differences 
in the knowledge bodies of different actors in networks (Nooteboom, 2002), that can describe the 
importance of individuals in the knowledge of different places in the learning process. Cognitive distance 
also offers us a multi-actor perspective. 
Our argument is based on a short review of theoretical contributions and an extensive and qualitative 
empirical investigation. Based on dialectic comments on the Uppsala model when introduced to the 
economic geography field, the literature review (sections 2 and 3) introduces the concept of cognitive 
distance into the obstacles analysis and extends the Uppsala model by illustrating efforts of subsidiaries to 
overcome obstacles via local embeddedness and absorbing local resources, particularly talents. The 
empirical investigation discusses starting points for developing propositions concerning the role of shifts in 
the complex structures of cognitive distance, its causes and its effects on business performance. We argue 
that the relevant cognitive distance for an overseas subsidiary has two dimensions: one is cognitive distance 
with the customers in the host country (external cognitive distance), and the other is with the parent 
company in the home country (internal cognitive distance). The subsidiary‟s learning efforts induce 
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dynamic changes in the patterns of cognitive distance, but do not necessarily remove important obstacles to 
business success.  
Our line of thought is based on applying the perspective of the company. While most other related 
studies in economic geography primarily examine regions or regionally confined networks, we place the 
firm in the center of focus. For the research question posed here, this is indeed a promising angle (cp. 
Maskell, 2001) and complements the existing literature.  
2 Theoretical background: Learning, unlearning and cognitive distance 
Although the Uppsala model has been widely acknowledged, it has major shortcomings when applied in 
the economic geography field. Firstly, it does not distinguish between the different functions of the parent 
firm and subsidiaries within an MNE. It is the experiential learning and decision-making of overseas 
subsidiaries that provides new knowledge which is potentially relevant for future investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, the decision about geography and entry mode of further operation is made by the parent firm. 
Secondly, it treats the business environment as a neoclassical market rather than a network, a web of 
relationships which is more suitable to the real world. Thirdly, an extremely important, underlying 
assumption of the Uppsala Model is the crucial role of the people who are involved in the foreign 
operations (Forsgren, 2002). However, their impact on the internationalization process is under-researched. 
We thus recall firstly the concept of cognitive distance, which focuses on knowledge actors rather than the 
state-level concept of psychic distance, secondly the concept of local embeddedness as access to local 
environments, and thirdly the resource-based view of the firm that explains more clearly the influence of 
human resources in the overseas branches. 
2.1 Liability of foreignness (LOF), psychic distance and cognitive distance 
According to the Uppsala model, the obstacles for overseas subsidiaries had their origin in the LOF, 
defined as the costs of doing business abroad that result in a competitive disadvantage for an MNE subunit 
(Zaheer, 1995). As mentioned above, psychic distance is used to illustrate the differences between home 
and host countries. The larger the psychic distance is, the larger the liability of foreignness. Obviously, it is 
easier for the investor to carry out investment in countries that offer similar conditions. Investment in 
countries separated by a large psychic distance requires an extended period of learning.  
As with cognitive distance, cognition is contingent upon the institutional environment and path-
dependent. People perceive, interpret and evaluate the world according to mental categories which they 
have developed in interaction with their institutional environment. This leads to the notion of cognitive 
distance between people. For firms, people in a firm need to share certain basic perceptions and values in 
order to align their competencies and motives sufficiently. Differences in such aspects of organizational 
focus produce cognitive distance between firms (Nooteboom et al., 2007). It is the virtue of inter-firm 
relations (Nooteboom, 2000) and a better concept than psychic distance when discussing the interaction 
between different individuals and firms in different places.  
2.2 Liability of outsider (LOO) and local embeddedness 
The concept of embeddedness shows what kind of efforts at the firm level - in this case the newly 
established subsidiary abroad - may be promising. Embeddedness was developed from social network 
theory (Granovetter, 1985). Networks consist of actors and their connections, and regionally confined 
networks tend to develop specific institutions that govern and affect communication, knowledge exchange 
and learning (Cooke, 1998). The concept of embeddedness stresses the positive effects of being part of a 
dense network of partners in which frequent and repeated cooperation is facilitated through trust and the 
development of network-specific institutions (Uzzi, 1996). Embedded actors benefit from access to new 
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information, but also to other actors‟ perceptions and judgments regarding this information. Hence, 
embeddedness may effectively allow the learning of place-specific knowledge, which is in fact the 
knowledge circulating in the network of local actors. For sustaining long-term success for a subsidiary in a 
host region, building connections into regional networks and becoming embedded seems to be of critical 
importance. This fact is acknowledged by Johanson and Vahlne (2009) by accepting LOO, defined as the 
liability that firms suffer when attempting to enter a foreign market where they have no relevant network 
position, which is an additional source of obstacles besides LOF. 
2.3 Resources-based view (RBV): New Argonauts 
While empirical research into local embeddedness focuses on the emerging local linkages of firms as an 
indicator for effective networking, RBV draws attention to the resources commanded by the firm examined, 
particularly its personnel (Kogut and Zander, 1993). According to this, learning and becoming embedded 
require people who learn and management that supports their learning efforts. In order to cross the 
knowledge between countries, „new Argonauts‟, as promoted by Saxenian and Sabel (2008), are needed - a 
special kind of human resources. An Argonaut is a person who is familiar with two distant regional 
knowledge bodies and network-related institutions; an Argonaut thus represents a crucial resource for 
entering distant locations and networks, and employing people with these features greatly affects business 
prospects.  
Hence, we must assume that in order to become embedded locally, a newly established subsidiary 
must acquire certain resources. This can be achieved by acquiring or employing local managers and 
personnel, in particular people who are familiar with the knowledge of both places, the one with that of the 
parent firm and the other with that of the subsidiary. Otherwise, embeddedness requires learning at the 
individual level of the managers and employees, and at the company level as an aggregate of individual 
learning. In both cases, the subsidiary adapts its resources to the new environment. 
However, this adaptation poses a serious challenge for many firms, as will be shown in this article, 
and firms differ in their capability to become embedded. For example, if FDI is carried out as an 
acquisition of a local firm whose organization is left unchanged, it will remain firmly embedded locally. 
However, if FDI is carried out as greenfield investment and mainly involves personnel from the country of 
origin, i.e. from China, the new firm starts with zero embeddedness. In this case, the expatriate 
management and personnel must learn or the company must employ local labor, with both necessitating a 
shift in resources. In short, the characters of firms, such as the background of the management group and 
the entry model, could lead to different capabilities for overcoming the obstacles abroad. These influences, 
overlooked by the Uppsala model, require deeper empirical studies. 
Table 1 summarizes the logic of our conceptual discussion. Based on the Uppsala model, obstacles for 
foreign subsidiaries originate from LOF and LOO, which could be overcome by embeddeding within local 
networks and absorbing new resources. The situation of each subsidiary for conquering the difficulties 
varies according to its capabilities. However, we have concerns about the effect of subsidiaries‟ efforts 
when we attempt to examine the interaction within the MNEs. The adaption of subsidiaries has 
consequences for the MNE as a whole. It extends the MNE‟s knowledge body as it adds new knowledge, 
but it may also create tension between the parent firm and its subsidiary, whose knowledge shifts away 
from that of the parent firm. The latter effect will be particularly prominent when learning new place-
specific knowledge is accompanied by forgetting knowledge that is less relevant at the new location. 
Forgetting at the level of an individual may be reinforced through interactions at the group level when new 
routines of working together within the subsidiary are becoming established (Szulanski, 1996). It can be 
expected that the knowledge, the routines and the core competence of the subsidiary move away from being 
close to the parent firm. This negative effect will also be checked in the empirical parts. 
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Table 1 Relevant concepts and their core arguments. 
Concept Level of explanation Content  
Uppsala model Impact of knowledge 
gaps between 
countries 
 LOF and psychic distance 
 LOO 
 
Cognitive distance Impact of knowledge 
gaps in networks 
 Place-specific knowledge bodies 
 Firm-specific knowledge, closely related to its 
region 
 Person-specific knowledge 
Embeddedness  Impact of social ties  Ways of becoming part of local networks and 
understanding the local knowledge body 
Resource-based view Impact of firm 
resources 
 Need to acquire or employ certain resources 
(e.g. Argonauts) 
 Learning in order to add / broaden knowledge 
body 
Source: Own compilation 
All these concepts acknowledge to some degree the importance of experience and learning for 
successful decision-making during foreign investments. The case of China‟s investors enables us to 
examine what happens when previous learning has been insufficient. This problem has thus far received 
little attention in the theoretical and empirical literature, but it is becoming increasingly pressing given the 
rise of China‟s outward investment. 
3 Literature Review 
The structure of cognitive distances has been neglected in the MNE subsidiary literature to date. Current 
discussion has been of a rather general and conceptual character, with very limited empirical investigation 
(Yamin and Andersson, 2011). Given that the outbound investment from China to developed economies is 
still a new phenomenon, most studies on China concern the local embeddedness of foreign MNEs in China 
(Lin et al. 2011; Sun and Du 2011; Zhou et al. 2011) and the mismatch between foreign MNEs and local 
firms in China (Zhou and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2011). 
Comparatively little research has been conducted to illustrate the interaction between parent 
companies, foreign subsidiaries and host regions. Of the few existing studies, some have investigated how 
the affiliates coped with the difficulties of becoming embedded in a foreign environment and influencing 
factors. Based on the observation of emerging economy MNEs in the United States, Barnard (2010) drew 
the conclusion that these subsidiaries are able to develop capabilities by drawing on more skilled 
employees and a better supplier base. Klossek et al. (2012) presented insights from interviews with Chinese 
MNEs in Germany indicating that subsidiaries‟ strategies to reduce their LOF depend on the establishment 
mode chosen: the subsidiaries established via acquisition are more likely to have used due diligence, 
sharing control with the local management and sharing work with local forces, whereas those established 
via greenfield prefer installing key employee roles. Meanwhile, some studies investigated the abilities of 
Chinese parent firms and their impact on subsidiaries. Chinese firms are labeled as latecomer firms lacking 
the resources such as technology and market access to offer the subsidiaries competitive advantages in 
developed economies (Mathews, 2002). Liu and Woywode (2011) used in-depth interviews with five 
Chinese companies in Germany to discover the influence of absorptive capacity on post-M&A operation. 
They discovered that a light-touch approach, which maintains the domestic management team and provides 
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decision-making autonomy, enables the success of subsidiaries. The loosened control from the parent firm 
gives the subsidiaries more chance of survival. 
4 Research, method and data 
4.1 Research area 
Germany is the most important destination of Chinese outbound investment in Europe (MOFCOM et al., 
2011). Inside Germany, Chinese investment is concentrated in three regions: the Hamburg Metropolitan 
Region, the FRM Metropolitan Region and the Ruhr/Rhine Metropolitan Region. In the remainder of this 
article, these regions will be referred to as „Hamburg‟, „Frankfurt‟ and „Cologne-Dusseldorf‟ (Figure 1).  
 
Source: based on interview with Invest in Northrhine-Westfalia (NRW), the Frankfurt Economic Development Corporation 
(Frankfurt EDC) (Frankfurt Wirtschaftsführung GmbH) and the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Figure 1 The geographical distribution of Chinese investment in Germany. 
For the empirical investigations, we chose Frankfurt and Cologne-Dusseldorf as case-study regions. 
Three reasons support our decision. Firstly, they are the major destinations for Chinese investors, not only 
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in terms of firm numbers (more than half of the number in Germany), but also in terms of quality. The most 
important MNEs (such as Huawei, ZTE, Sany, Haier, Hisense, MINMETALS, five state-owned banks and 
major Chinese airline firms) have all located their headquarters and main activities in these two regions. 
Secondly, Chinese investment is also very important for these two regions. They belong to the federal 
states NRW and Hesse, which are the two states that attract the largest foreign investment in Germany. 
China was the largest source of FDI for NRW in 2010. Finally, the two regions have excellent personal and 
business connections, as suggested by interviewees whom we will mention later.  
4.2 Company population in the study region 
The research that deals with the above-mentioned questions must concentrate on companies that are fully 
functioning subsidiaries of parent companies in China, i.e. excluding independent Chinese-owned firms in 
Germany, particularly restaurants and supermarkets. However, an accurate and complete database of these 
companies in Germany does not exist for the following reasons:  
 Germany does not have specific authorities or statistical surveys regarding Chinese MNEs. The 
related authorities, such as the EDC or Investment in Germany, register all firms that received the 
registration money from China as Chinese firms, regardless of whether they are affiliates of 
MNEs or single firms. 
 The main job of these authorities is to attract FDI rather than to supervise the business routine. 
Therefore, some Chinese subsidiaries that only exist on paper or that have gone out of business or 
have moved out of the region may still remain on their lists. An illustrative case is that of a 
consultant firm in Frankfurt which is representative for at least twenty firms. 
Therefore, the company population had to be established by using and comparing various sources.  
 From the Chinese side, there is information for 399 Chinese firms which received a license from 
the Chinese government to invest in Germany released by MOFCOM on its official website2, 
including information such as names and locations of parent firms and names, locations and 
business arrangements of affiliates. All the firms listed are MNEs, which makes this suitable as 
the basic database for our research. However, the database is quite rough. Among the 399 Chinese 
firms, around 40 lists are duplicated and only around half of the firms‟ names can be found on the 
German website. As for our study region, we could only confirm the contact information of 50 
firms. 
 Since there are no identical statistics from the German side, we collected data from interviews 
with Frankfurt EDC and Investment in NRW. According to them, there are around 900 firms in 
the study region. However, the number of Chinese MNEs‟ subsidiaries is far lower than this 
number for the two reasons mentioned above. 
 The third data source is local Chinese publications: the Chinese business yellow pages in 
Germany, called “China address book 2011”, and local Chinese newspapers, such as the Chinese 
Business Newspaper (Hua Shang Bao) and the Europe Times (Ou Zhou Xin Bao), which report 
the Chinese business news in Germany. 
Finally, we completed the list with 93 firms that released their contact details. The number is twice 
that collected from the Chinese side, but 10% of that collected from the German authorities. During this 
company list search period, we were able to gauge the general situation of Chinese enterprises in Germany. 
First of all, most of the FDI flow is concentrated in a small number of large M&A projects (e.g. Lenovo 
acquiring Medion) and large companies (Sany invested 100 million Euro
3
 and Huawei has hired more than 
two thousand employees in Germany
4
), while small firms such as consultant or trading service firms hiring 
fewer than 5 employees account for the largest number of firms (Wang and Noisser， 2008). Secondly, a 
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large number of small firms suggests that personal investment and immigration is still an important reason 
for Chinese investment in Germany (Sohm et al., 2009). Thirdly, some MNE subsidiaries are not willing to 
release their information, including contact information, to the public. Some enterprises simply wish to 
promote the brand name by “investing” in Germany, while others do not realize its importance, or say that 
they do not follow the rules for running a business in Germany. 
4.3 Data collection: understanding Chinese foreign subsidiaries 
As the research on China‟s investment in industrialized countries is still in its infant stage, empirical 
research must be exploratory in nature. Two approaches have been chosen: overt participant observation 
and interviews.  
Participant observation was introduced into geographical research in the 1980s (Jackson, 1983) and 
has been reexamined recently. In one overt study, the researchers informed the study group about the 
purpose and scope of the study before they joined the group (Hay, 2000). The observation was carried out 
by the joint Chinese and German team from October 2009 to September 2011, with the state of Hesse as a 
major supporting institution. We collected information from formal events within the local Chinese 
community, such as “Focus on China-FRM inviting you” held once every three months by FRM GmbH, 
“China in Dialogue” held by Frankfurt EDC, “China Talent Day” held by the Chinese Enterprises 
Association (CEA) in NRW and the Chinese Student Association in Germany, along with others. Secondly, 
we held informal talks with the participants during free time, such as lunch or dinner, drinking and sports 
time. We then referred to the above-mentioned local publications and gray materials. The extended 
participant observation allowed us access to informal discussions and interchanges, and provided inductive 
understanding of actors‟ perceptions (Berg 2003) from both the Chinese and German sides. 
Interviews were also conducted parallel to gain a more formal and direct understanding of our main 
research issues (Garcia-Pont et al., 2009). The interviews were taken step by step. Firstly, we interviewed 
some experts or key persons in government and public organizations to gain an initial impression of 
Chinese MNEs in Germany, particularly in the study region. We then approached as many firms as possible 
to interview the general managers and other members of the management group. Finally, we interviewed 
associations, parent firms, local partners or customers and service corporations to gather their comments on 
subsidiaries‟ behavior. We attempted to reach them in the same manner, namely by first sending an e-mail 
with an introduction and letter of recommendation from the Economic and Transport Department of the 
state of Hesse, then by telephoning them within a month if there was no reply, and finally by carrying out 
interviews if accepted. The face-to-face semi-structured interviews were chosen because interviews could 
provide better answers to the questions about how and why. This is particularly relevant for our case, since 
Chinese people are often too “polite” to mention difficulties and bad experiences via questionnaire, as 
suggested by an expert who conducted a questionnaire in Hesse in 2008, “You need to talk with them face 
to face, (because it is only in this way that) they will tell the true story and you can feel and understand the 
words between lines”.  
4.4 Sample characters 
We carried out 56 interviews with Chinese MNE subsidiaries and related organizations lasting between 45 
minutes and 2 hours. The interviewees were mainly general managers or even founders of the subsidiaries, 
as well as PR managers and engineers. We talked with some of them more than twice if necessary. The 
structure of the interview is shown below (Table 2).  
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Table 2 Characteristics of companies and experts interviewed. 
Classification Examples Person-time 
First step 
Government   Economic and Transport Department of the State of Hesse 
 General Consultant of P. R. China in Frankfurt am Main 
 China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
German branch 
4 
Quasi-Government  Frankfurt EDC 
 Investment in NRW 
13 
Academic experts  Andreas Klossek 2 
Second step 
Chinese SOEs  China Telecom 
 China Travelsky 
5 
Chinese private 
enterprises 
 Huawei 
 ZTE 
 Shenyang Brilliant elevator 
12 
Chinese-German joint 
venture 
 Xiamen Hongfa Electro acoustic Co., Ltd 2 
Third step 
Intermediary services  MPR GmbH (Market and strategic consultant) 
 Wotax (Tax adviser) 
6 
Non-profit 
organizations  
 German-China Economic Association 
 CEA in NRW 
6 
German cooperator  Global Fenestration Relation GmbH 3 
Parent firm in China  MINMETALS 3 
The methods were chosen as it seemed crucial to understand how the Chinese affiliates work and to 
acquire in-depth and firm-centered information. The results are not representative in a statistical sense; 
however, the methods ensure that key structures and processes that shape firms are captured. They allow 
the establishment of initial propositions regarding our research questions. The results discussed here are 
solid in the sense that they were checked with triangulation (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). The following 
section uses quotes from the interviews to illustrate the findings. 
5 Results 
When carrying out interviews, we concentrated on four issues: (1) whether Chinese companies experience 
obstacles when they invest in Germany; (2) if so, what kind of obstacles they face; (3) the reasons for these 
obstacles; (4) Their reactions and these difficulties with taking proper reactions. This section cites the 
content of the interviews to illustrate these issues. It is organized as follows: firstly, we discuss the external 
cognitive distance originating from psychic distance and LOF. Then we evaluate the effect of local 
embeddeness. We present the fact that the process of embeddedness can „create‟ internal cognitive distance 
and illustrate the knowledge structure an overseas subsidiary must face. This paradox can be carefully 
linked to company characteristics and resources, which is explained in the third part. The lack of new 
Argonauts, which makes the situation of Chinese firms in Germany more difficult, will be discussed in the 
final part. This structure follows the logic of our interviews and reflects typical experience of investors. 
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5.1 The external cognitive distance stemming from liability of foreignness (LOF) 
Based on our observation, Chinese MNEs face external cognitive distance when investing in Germany. 
Chinese companies and experts interviewed asserted that the business environment in Germany was too 
complicated and unfamiliar to understand. The situation was tougher because they, unlike MNEs from 
developed economies, did not own the internationally acknowledged brand to offset the cognitive distance 
(Child and Rodrigues, 2005). As an executive and an associate secretary mentioned: 
“[Among Chinese MNEs in Germany], only [a limited number of firms such as] Huawei are 
successful. They have to deal with all kinds of misunderstandings with customers and the public], most 
of which turn out to produce failures‟, and „Some members of our club, such as Dongfeng Auto, are 
well-known in China with good reputations, however they are questionable to the public in Germany. 
Most Germans think that „made in China‟ means low quality and price”. 
The external cognitive distance is caused by huge language, business customs and cultural differences 
between China and Germany. Firstly, some Chinese employees speak only English or just very basic 
German. The linguistic incompetence causes many misunderstandings (Wang and Noisser, 2008). Secondly, 
German business is based on laws, while network relationships are more important in China (Yeung, 1994). 
A tax adviser gave us a good example of the misunderstanding:  
“In China, channels and connections with the government are important; in Germany, knowing 
the rules is important. A small company did business well in Germany but the manager thought it too 
time consuming to claim the tax, so he asked me whether it was possible to give some money to a 
government officer and save his trouble. When he asked, he didn‟t realize the importance of following 
the legal and accounting system. That is also why Chinese companies don‟t have a good reputation 
here”. 
Thirdly, German business culture values information transparency, while China prefers modesty 
(Sohm et al., 2009), for example only large firms such as Huawei and Sany have a PR department and 
release the firms‟ information regularly. A PR manger put it this way: 
“Chinese people believe that silence is a good character. They value low-key behavior. People 
would rather do business than talk. But the „silence‟ adds more suspicion for the German public”. 
5.2 The negative effects of embeddedness: the emergence of internal cognitive distance 
In the above cognitive distance analysis, Chinese MNE subsidiary is equated to Chinese institution, while 
German firm is equated to German culture. The theoretical discussion summarized in this paper‟s theory 
section suggests that the appropriate solution for this problem is becoming embedded and learning to deal 
with the local culture. However, the growing internal cognitive distance between subsidiaries and the 
parent firm is another cause of problems. Individual learning in affiliates in Germany shifts the 
understanding, values and ideas of the managers in the affiliate. This move is not understood back in China, 
and the cognitive distance is thus not reduced, but rather shifted from being external to internal. This is the 
negative effect of local embeddedness and learning that has been overlooked in the Uppsala model. A 
subsidiary manager asserted that:  
“The communication between the parent firm and customers via us costs a lot of time and money. 
[Taking after-sales service as an example]. We have to hire a German to negotiate with customers, 
while employing a Chinese to talk [with the parent company] about the quality of goods and logistics. 
They [the parent firm] don‟t care about the schedule and are flexible regarding the plan, which can‟t 
be understood by German employees and customers. ”. 
A German cooperator of a Chinese subsidiary held the opinion that:  
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“The parent companies send Chinese people [to Germany] but do not give them the autonomy to 
decide. All decisions are made in China, not knowing what really happens in the German market. Of 
course, all the subsidiary‟s decisions are behind the market and sometimes even wrong”. The opinion 
is also shared by a subsidiary‟s manager: “It is really not easy to communicate with the board back in 
China. The chief executive officer (CEO) is not well educated. It was possible [for him] to run a firm 
with dozens of employees based on experience. But it can‟t work for a firm with thousands of 
employees, particularly with international ambition”. 
As Figure 2 shows, we found cases illustrating that cognitive distances between the parent firms in 
China and the customers in Germany are the same prior to firms‟ internationalization, since the cognitive 
distances at this time are mainly due to the psychic distance between China and Germany and the Chinese 
firms‟ ability remains at a similar level. All the subsidiaries have the same total cognitive distances with 
which to cope. They must maneuver in a spectrum of cognitive distances between places and firms and 
make sure that they learn how to succeed in the host locality, while at the same time maintaining their 
ability to communicate with the parent firm. 
 
Source: Own draft 
Figure 2 The cognitive distances between parent firms, subsidiaries and local customers 
5.3 Characteristics of the enterprises' resources: different positions of subsidiaries in 
the cognitive distance structure 
The theoretical section suggests that firm resources influence the extent of embeddedness. They also 
influence the position of a subsidiary between parent firm and local customer based on our observation in 
figure 2. The following three factors are important. 
The first is the background and prior experience of the management team, most importantly in new 
and small companies (Reuber and Fischer, 1997). The structure of the management team could be Chinese 
only, overseas Chinese who studied or worked outside China before, Chinese and Germans cooperating 
together, and German only. The position a subsidiary could take is moving further away from the parent 
firm and closer to German customers correspondingly (Figure 3). The reasons are easy to understand. The 
Chinese managers know parent firms well but lack the language ability and knowledge about the German 
locality (Wang and Noisser, 2008). As a market consultant mentioned:  
“The Chinese manager, who has never spent time in Germany, needs to learn [himself] first, 
[which] could take years. He cares about the career path when he goes back to China. Therefore, he 
may have more tendencies to keep in step with the parent firm in China”.  
On the other side, the German managers mostly find it difficult to work with the parent firms in China: 
“They [parent firm] pay little attention to the time schedule. I need to do extra work to entertain 
these guys [from China] who always want to have Chinese food only”. 
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Source: Own draft 
Figure 3 The background of manager groups’ influence on cognitive distance structure 
Secondly, the situation varies according to the ownership of the parent firms, since firms of the same 
ownership have a similar tendency of choosing management groups. Normally, SOEs, such as China Bank, 
Air China and Minmetal, have more to consider beyond profit. The general manager is mostly Chinese, 
sent from the parent firm, who does not have overseas experience. Private firms, however, prefer to hire 
overseas Chinese who can manage the German employees, understand German customers, and 
communicate with the Chinese parent firm at the same time. Take Hongfa as an example. The general 
manager is overseas Chinese. He hired two vice-managers, an experienced German responsible for 
marketing and a Chinese for logistics and communication with China. He stated that: 
“The differences between German [customers] and the Chinese [parent firm] are settled by the 
heterogeneous management group inside the firm [subsidiary]”. 
In this situation, the subsidiaries are closer to German society (Figure 4). 
 
 
Source: Own draft 
Figure 4 The subsidiary ownership’s influence on cognitive distance structure 
The third structural factor is entry modes (Klossek et al., 2012). What was mentioned in the last 
paragraph concerning the influence of ownership is based on the data of firms with greenfield investment 
as an entry mode. The subsidiaries that engage in merger or acquisition in Germany normally retain the 
management group from the German part and send Chinese from the parent firm as supervisors and 
communicators (Liu and Woywode, 2011), such as Beijing No. 1 Machine Tool Plant (acquiring Adolf 
Waldrich Coburg GmbH & Co. KG). In this situation, the cognitive distance inside Germany is very small 
and the main distance exists between the affiliate and the parent firm (Klossek et al., 2012). 
5.4 The lack of new Argonauts 
When asked about the biggest reason for the obstacles for Chinese firms, all interviewees admitted that 
qualified managers who can understand both China and Germany, in other words new Argonauts, are 
essential for the affiliates to survive in Germany (Tirpitz et al., 2011). However, the firms found it difficult 
to find and hire them. According to the interviews, three factors may explain this phenomenon.  
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The first is a lack of new Argonauts in Germany (Wang and Noisser, 2008). Germany is not an 
immigrant country and the official language, German, is not well known among Chinese, therefore the 
local Chinese community is far less developed than in the USA. Meanwhile, limited numbers of Germans 
have had previous experience working with or for Chinese companies, or know the Chinese language and 
habits. Moreover, as a human resource consultant stated:  
"The qualified ones normally work in good German firms which do business in China with high 
salaries. They don‟t know the Chinese firms [subsidiaries] and prefer to avoid the unknown risks, 
such as insurance". 
Secondly, the local Chinese community has two sub-circles which share little overlap. This means that 
fewer Chinese can be approached or used by the other sub-circle. The first sub-circle is made up of 
overseas Chinese who came to Germany 20 years ago or earlier. They speak fluent German and know the 
local environment quite well. Some of them are not well educated, for example without university degrees. 
The second consists of the Chinese who came to Germany after the Chinese „Go Global‟ policy in 1999. 
These Chinese may have family in China and return there regularly, most of them speaking English as a 
foreign language and working in Chinese SOEs and Chinese authorities. Generally, they are well educated. 
Inside the sub-circles, people are well connected, and they can obtain business and employees through 
recommendation between friends, as asserted by an interviewee. Little overlap exists between sub-circles 
because of different educational backgrounds, carrier appeal, different opinions on Chinese policies and 
other reasons. 
Finally, most subsidiaries lack the ability to manage the talent. Some companies do not realize the 
importance of the local employees. Some companies do not know how to manage it, or are not even aware 
of it. Take an example from our interviews:  
“A company hired a German but had no idea about contracts. The employee downloaded the 
contract from the website and the company just signed it. After three months, the company wanted to 
fire this person, but he claimed 30,000 Euro as compensation. This caused a significant loss for this 
firm”.  
It seems that the new Argonauts are missing for Chinese firms in Germany. On the one hand, this 
explains why Chinese firms have many difficulties in Germany and do not perform well financially. On the 
other hand, the new Argonauts argument based on the intensive connection between Taiwan and the USA 
may not be suitable for other countries with different language and immigrant histories. 
In this section, we argue that the obstacles for foreign subsidiaries come not only from LOF and LOO, 
but also from the emerging internal cognitive distance arising from the embeddedness efforts, with the lack 
of new Argonauts making the situation of Chinese firms in Germany tougher.  
6 Conclusion and discussion 
This paper introduces the cognitive distance concept into the analysis of Chinese MNE subsidiaries‟ 
obstacles in Germany as a contrast to the well-established Uppsala model. The concept of cognitive 
distance – which is more open and actor-focused rather than country-focused – is better suited for 
understanding the problems of Chinese investors in Germany, as many of them follow a radical approach to 
foreign investment. It allows us to take into consideration what happens when an affiliate manages to 
overcome the LOF and the LOO: it experiences a transformation that takes it further away from the parent 
firm and the home country and closer to the host country and its local networks. Cognitive distance also 
allows us to understand what can be done to allow an affiliate to manage external and internal knowledge 
gaps successfully: the main field of action is learning at an individual level, or employing managers who 
Article 3 Cognitive Distance and Obstacles to Subsidiary Business Success Si, Liefner 
68 
 
live in both business cultures and know how to bridge the distances. Hence, the concept of cognitive 
distance can combine elements of the Uppsala model, the RBV and the embeddedness approach.  
Moreover, our research supports a key insight from the cognitive distance concept: we highlight the 
fact that learning to become part of local networks for the purpose of accessing relevant host locality 
knowledge simultaneously increases the unwillingness or inability to communicate effectively with the 
parent firm. The standard assumption that communicative abilities and knowledge distance diverge holds 
true. This is particularly important for inexperienced investors who have not had the chance to establish 
management routines that allow the handling of these difficulties.   
This article was not intended to come up with a new model of internationalization that could replace 
existing ones and relate better to the case of Chinese investors. However, it is important to notice that 
Chinese investors constitute a group of firms whose behavior does not fit the assumptions of this standard 
model. This needs to be taken into account when conducting empirical research on China‟s Outward FDI 
and assessing its prospects and potential economic impact both worldwide and on the local scale. The 
concept of cognitive distance offers a framework which is better suited to studying and understanding the 
nature and consequences of Chinese investment in advanced markets.  
We have no indication that the case of Chinese investment in Germany is a single exception to the rule. 
On the contrary, we assume that Chinese firms in other non-English-speaking countries face similar 
challenges, including most other parts of Europe. For these countries, obstacles – language barriers and the 
lack of Argonauts – can be assumed to exist as well. It is mainly due to the prominence of the German 
economy in continental Europe that these challenges can be observed earlier.  
Finally, the interesting question remains concerning to what degree our results are typical for a 
Chinese firm or simply features of investors from developing countries in general. Obviously, a lack of 
experience, resource scarcity and the liability of being unknown in the host locality are features shared by 
firms from other national backgrounds as well. However, there are also China-specific factors involved that 
shape the pattern observed here. The fact that many Chinese firms feel encouraged to go abroad without 
having a history of experience from investing in countries that are closer may be a unique feature. The 
same may hold true for the desire to reach out for technological leaders and leapfrog through outward 
investment. However, another major factor may affect the promises of Chinese investment negatively, and 
strongly so when compared with investment from many other developing countries, namely public 
skepticism: some segments of the German public express general concern about investment from China; 
however, such concern is not unique to Germany, but indeed widespread in the Western world. Three 
factors can be identified which affect the success of Chinese firms in the early investment period. Firstly, 
the government support for investors raises the question of who is investing in the end – independent firms 
or the Chinese nation? Secondly, the image of China as a „low-quality‟ provider is reiterated frequently in 
the public media. Thirdly, a lack of transparency in Chinese business transactions – be it real or an outcome 
of the Chinese language – raises the suspicion that investors may follow hidden agendas. Taken together, 
the resulting public skepticism is a huge burden for those Chinese affiliates that wish to build up close 
contacts to local business partners and, more importantly, attract qualified personnel. 
Hence, while many Chinese investors can command large amounts of capital and draw on huge sales 
successes, their prospects for quick success in advanced markets must be viewed with caution. Their radical 
approach to foreign investment faces important obstacles, the overcoming of which will take time. The fact 
that many difficulties faced by Chinese investors result from inadequate background knowledge, however, 
signals that there is room for private or public support services to smoothen their entrance into advanced 
locations and markets. 
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Abstract: This paper introduces the cognitive distance concept into the analysis of Chinese FDI in Germany. 
This is a recent phenomenon still poorly understood theoretically and empirically. Based on qualitative 
information, it discusses factors contributing to cognitive distances between firms in China and in Germany, 
such as language, institutional and market differences, and shows that FDI is made to serve as a way to 
reducing or crossing this cognitive distance. Our research unpacks the concept of global pipelines for 
knowledge sharing in a local-global context and explores the great difficulties to be overcome for such 
pipelines to transfer knowledge. 
Keywords: Chinese transnational company; Subsidiary; Cognitive distance; Germany 
 
1 Introduction: FDI and cognitive distance 
In the last ten years, transnational companies (TNCs) from China have developed very quickly. China was 
among the top ten largest sources of FDI in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011). China‟s FDI has been an interesting 
topic both theoretically and empirically, as its development, its consequences and the conditions affecting it 
are not yet well understood (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). Despite a number of studies on FDI to Africa 
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009) or to East and Southeast Asia (Yeung and Liu, 2008), research about FDI 
from China to developed economies, particularly to the EU, remains underdeveloped. 
This paper limits itself to the discussion of the case of Chinese FDI in Germany in the light of the 
concept of cognitive distance. It will be shown below that the concept of cognitive distance offers a 
powerful tool for understanding some of the key features of recent Chinese FDI in Germany, in particular 
because the concept has so far remained very broad. Hence, cognitive distance can function as a container 
term for a set of more precisely defined and measurable factors.  
Cognitive distance has entered the field of economic geography with the work of scholars such as 
Noteboom / Boschma. The concept has its origins in the field of network theory. Its main argument centers 
on the fact that distant actors in networks have different knowledge backgrounds and may seek an optimum 
balance of novelty in communicability when cooperating: cognitive distance increases learning 
opportunities but limits understanding. The empirically based literature that uses this concept often takes 
cognitive distance as a factor that may determine the value and the potential success of network relations. 
However, the concept itself – i.e. the question of what it is that „makes‟ cognitive distance, or to put it 
differently, the question of what kind of knowledge is relevant here – remains underdeveloped conceptually, 
with a lack of empirical investigations being the main reason for this (Boschma, 2005). A second void in 
this young field of studies relates to the dynamics of cognitive distance. Most studies take cognitive 
distance as a feature of network relations that has to be dealt with as a short-term constant in cross-sectional 
analysis. However, it is obvious that cognitive distance must be changing dynamically with every learning 
effort of any of the partners involved in a network relationship. If this point is explored in the related 
literature at all, it is usually within the context of learning efforts that reduce the cognitive distance between 
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two partners. A similar focus prevails in the literature that deals with related terms, such as that of psychic 
distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1997; 2009). Such a focus, however, draws attention to the benefits of 
learning and proximity – spatial, sector, temporal, etc. But it is not well suited to exploring the factors 
which influence the emergence of cognitive distance.  
The concept of cognitive distance is neutral towards power differences between actors and the way 
they affect relations. The issue of power, however, has attracted researchers‟ interest, in particular in 
connection with research into global value chains and global production networks (e.g. Boschma, 2005). 
One observation is that a superior knowledge base – be it technological, organizational, or market 
knowledge – usually goes hand-in-hand with the power to govern large parts of value chains. Although 
power relations are not the main focus of this study, and not easy to identify using the cognitive distance 
framework either, we discuss this issue based on our empirical findings.  
Here, the empirical observation of a new stream of FDI between very different countries (China and 
Germany) and the need to understand the cognitive distance concept match and combine to form the 
following research question: what factors contribute to the cognitive distance in the dynamic relationship 
between headquarters (HQ) in China and their subsidiaries in Germany? In answering these two questions, 
our research investigates the concept of global pipelines for knowledge transfer in a local-global context 
(Bathelt et al., 2004): Chinese TNCs serve as intra-firm knowledge channels across countries to transfer, 
explore and exploit the distant knowledge. We also uncover the great difficulties to be overcome for such 
pipelines to transfer knowledge, while outlining TNC subsidiary capability which influences the nexus 
between global pipelines and local knowledge.  
As Chinese FDI in Germany is still at an early stage, and neither the concept of cognitive distance 
itself nor its link to this type of FDI have been previously discussed in the academic literature, this paper 
must rely on explorative and qualitative information. Its results will help generate more elaborate 
hypotheses for quantitative analyses that may follow in the future, but it cannot answer comprehensively 
the many questions relating to the prospects of Chinese FDI in developed economies. However, the 
systematic understanding of the factors affecting cognitive distance developed in this paper allows for the 
formulation of several policy implications for investors and local policymakers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first, we briefly introduce the overall 
development of FDI from China to Germany. We then focus on the conceptual development of cognitive 
distance, including the influencing factors and dynamic development. After a short explanation of the 
research method and data, we present the results from interviews: why Chinese firms carry out FDI, the 
supposed function of overseas subsidiaries, and the cognitive distance development among HQ in China, 
Chinese TNC subsidiaries in Germany and German locality. The final section provides a conclusion and 
implications for TNCs and government. 
2 Overview: Outward FDI from China 
Since the launch of the economic reforms in 1978, China has experienced high-speed growth of its 
economy (GDP) and inward FDI (Wei, 1999). The outward FDI, however, only emerged after 1999 when 
China carried out the “Going Global” policy, and in 2006, the end of the transaction period of China's 
accession to the WTO, the growth of outward FDI surpassed that of inward FDI for the first time. Among 
all the destinations, the EU took 8.7 percent of the FDI from China, amounting to 59.63 billion USD in 
2010, twice the figure of the previous year. 53.6% of FDI flowed into leasing and business services, 34% 
into the manufacturing industry and 5.4% into finance (MOFCOM et al., 2011).  
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Germany is the most important destination of Chinese outbound investment in the EU (MOFCOM et 
al., 2011). The growth of FDI flow to Germany shares a similar trend to the general FDI from China 
(Figure 1), which has increased dramatically by some 25% annually since 2005. 
 
 
Data source: UNCTAD http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx and deutsche bundesbank 
Figure 1 The historical comparison between FDI from China and FDI from China to Germany  
The industrial and entry mode changes are associated with the location changes of Chinese investment 
in Germany (Table 1). In 1979, the first Chinese Consulate was established in the Hamburg Metropolitan 
Region (Hamburg), and Hamburg was officially twinned with Shanghai as part of the ports and trade 
cooperation. Most Chinese enterprises in trade services and logistics were established in Hamburg, taking 
advantage of its convenient connection to the whole of Europe (Assmann, 2003). Some large enterprises 
from Shanghai, such as Baosteel from the steel industry, also operated here. From around 1990, the 
Frankfurt/Rhine/Main Metropolitan Region (Frankfurt) became increasingly important because of its 
airport, fair events and financial importance in the EU. It is also a historical place of residence for overseas 
Chinese. Therefore, the industries related to goods logistics became concentrated in Hamburg, while the 
industries servicing frequent cross-border personnel flow moved to Frankfurt. The four national banks and 
three national airlines all founded their European headquarters in Frankfurt. Most Chinese firms in both 
regions, whether from the manufacturing industry, such as Shenyang Brilliant Elevator, or from the service 
industry, such as China Telecom, function as sales offices or after-sales service providers, with market-
seeking being their main motivation (CCPIT, 2010). These firms are small and function as a trial for 
entering the German and perhaps even the European market (Wang and Noisser, 2008).  
Since 2005, however, the Ruhr/Rhine Metropolitan Region (Ruhr), a long-standing industrial region, 
has emerged as the most attractive location. Many Chinese enterprises from the mining, steel, 
telecommunication and machinery manufacturing industries invest there due to its strong industrial base, 
human resources and technical universities. Whether operating via Greenfield investment (Huawei and 
ZTE) or via M&A (Sany), the individual investments made in Ruhr mostly involve more than 3 million 
Euro, creating more than 50 job positions. There have been large-scale M&As in South Germany (Baden-
Württemberg and Bavaria) in the last five years as well. These firms include construction machinery 
manufacturers, machinery tool producers and auto components suppliers, i.e. areas in which German firms 
possess globally advanced technology but display poor financial performance due to Germany's shrinking 
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market (Shenyang machinery tool). This has been the new trend following the financial crisis, and is also a 
result of visa limitation for Chinese in these two states. The firms employing M&A and investing a huge 
amount of money are seeking the good reputation of “made in Germany” and state-of-the-art technology, 
while leaving the main market in China. Beijing No.1 Machinery Tool Plant merging with Waldrich 
Coburg and Sany Group merging with Putzmeister Group are examples of this (Sohm et al., 2009). The 
technology that they seek is mutual and commercialized with low risk. The FDI to Italy and England has 
similar motivation and entry modes (CCPIT, 2010; Liu and Tian, 2008). 
Table 1 The geographical and industrial evolution of Chinese firms in Germany 
Region Active 
period 
Number 
of firms 
Industries Company example Entry modes 
Hamburg 1980-2000 400 Trade service Shanghai Far East 
Hamburg Trading 
Corporation GmbH 
Greenfield 
 Logistics COSCO Greenfield 
 Shipping China State 
Shipbuilding 
(Europe) GmbH 
Greenfield 
Frankfurt 1990-2010 266 Trade, fair and travel 
service 
CBT China Book 
Trading GmbH 
Greenfield 
 Bank Bank of China Greenfield 
 Airline Air China Greenfield 
Ruhr 2005- 660 Mining and steel MINMETALS Greenfield 
 Telecommunication Huawei, ZTE Greenfield 
 Construction 
Machinery 
manufacturing  
Sany Greenfield, M&A 
Source: based on interviews with Invest in NRW, the Frankfurt EDC (Frankfurt Wirtschaftsführung GmbH) and the 
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
All in all, the surging of FDI since 2005 is associated with emerging M&As in Ruhr and the other two 
regions and motivation changes from market-seeking to technology-seeking (cp. Dunning, 2000). Chinese 
enterprises chose the location according to the industrial competitive advantage of the region. The location 
changes also reflect the industrial and functional changes of Chinese investment. 
3 Theoretical review: Knowledge, cognitive distance and transnational 
companies (TNCs) 
In this section, we will review three issues: where cognitive distance comes from, the interrelationship 
between learning and cognitive distance, and influencing factors when TNCs from emerging economies 
become involved in developed economies.  
3.1 What is cognitive distance and where does it come from? 
Knowledge has been recognized as a central component of innovation and value creation (Gerlter, 2003). 
Knowledge is associated with a process that involves cognition structures which can assimilate information 
and put it into a wider context (Howells, 2002). Here, cognition denotes a broad range of mental activity, 
including perception, sense making, categorization, inference, value judgments, emotions and feelings. 
Different people perceive, interpret and evaluate the world differently to the extent that they have 
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developed in interaction with their physical and social/institutional environment, which leads to cognitive 
distance between people (Nooteboom, 2000). For firms to achieve a common purpose, people inside need 
to share certain basic perceptions and values to align their competencies and motives sufficiently 
(Nooteboom et al., 2007). In this article, therefore, we define cognitive distance as knowledge differences 
in the knowledge bodies (e.g. employees) of different actors (e.g. firms) in networks. It is the virtue of 
inter-firm relations in knowledge-based economies. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the issue of “what kinds of knowledge differences exist” demands 
deeper research. Based on the existing theoretical and empirical research, three kinds of knowledge 
differences were included for the cross-country analysis. The first is language, which is the basic tool for 
acquiring and using systems of communication. When two countries are involved, the sharing of language 
is very important for exchanging and sharing knowledge among people and firms. The second is 
institutional knowledge. Institutions are formally defined as humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction (North, 1990). Economic actions are embedded in institutional environments, and the 
institutional environment surrounding organizations affects an organization‟s behavior, decisions and 
learning-through-interacting (Gertler, 2001). Here, institutional knowledge refers to laws, rules, the 
methods of searching for an exchange partner and of judging the quality of their offer or the nature of their 
needs, and the methods of establishing and maintaining relationships with partners (Eriksson et al., 1997). 
The third is commercialized-technological knowledge. This has two meanings. Firstly, different countries 
and regions have different preferences which lead to different designs and products to meet the local 
market demands. This is more obvious for firms focusing on sales and service functions. Secondly, 
technological knowledge, such as patents and R&D, could also be a factor for cognitive distance. 
Nooteboom et al. (2007) empirically prove that in company alliances for exploration purposes, 
technological knowledge is a sub-dimension of cognitive distance. This technology knowledge difference is 
more significant for subsidiaries with research functions. 
The knowledge differences have been profoundly analyzed in studies on the local embeddedness and 
knowledge outsourcing of foreign MNEs in China (Lin et al., 2011; Sun and Du, 2011; Zhou et al., 2011) 
and the impact of the home countries by comparing the historical and geographical differences between the 
FDI from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, which share a similar Chinese culture, and that from other 
developed economies such as Japan, the USA and the EU (Wei et al., 2012; Wu, 1999; Yang, 2007; Zhao 
and Zhang, 2007; Zhao et al., 2012). In addition, the studies of the mismatch between foreign MNEs and 
local firms in China also suggest that the institutional and technical knowledge differences are part of the 
reason that foreign MNEs are not well integrated into the local networks (He 2003, He and Fu, 2008, Zhou 
and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2011).  
3.2 The interaction between learning and cognitive distance 
The biggest difference between the cognitive distance concept and other concepts such as psychic distance 
is that the former treats distance not only as a problem, but also as an opportunity (Mowery et al, 1996). 
Nooteboom (2002) proposed an inverted U-shaped relationship between cognitive distance and learning. 
Here, learning is the growth of knowledge: gaining more interpreted data (information), gaining 
understanding (claims of deductive or causal ordering), or gaining skill to perform. Figure 2 illustrates this 
fundamental idea. As the cognitive distance increases, so does the positive effect of resource heterogeneity 
(novelty value line). This is due to the fact that when people with different knowledge and perspectives 
interact, they stimulate and help each other to stretch their knowledge for the purpose of bridging and 
connecting differing information. Cognitive distance thus yields opportunities for novel combinations of 
complementary resources. However, as the cognitive distance increases, the positive effect of resource 
homogeneity decreases (absorptive ability line), as a certain mutual understanding and familiarity breeds 
trust (Gulati, 1995), which facilitates successful collaboration. At a certain point, cognitive distance 
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becomes so great as to preclude the sufficient mutual understanding needed to utilize those opportunities 
(Nooteboom et al., 2007). This argument was proved when Huber (2012) studied the cognitive distance 
among firms in the Cambridge information technology cluster based on interviews. The results suggest that 
knowledge workers enable learning-by-interacting by ensuring that they share a common technical 
language and by allowing a certain degree of difference in terms of know-how, know-what and the way of 
thinking. 
  
Source: Nooteboom, et al. 2007 
Figure 2 Optimal cognitive distance model 
This is a static and equilibrium model for the search for optimal cognitive distance. Moreover, 
cognitive distance is a dynamic concept which evolves as the learning occurs. When talking about two 
firms, learning can entail the reduction of cognitive distance, which is known as „identification‟, or the 
bridging of cognitive distance, which is known as „empathy‟. When this model is applied to the analysis of 
the investment of a TNC in a foreign country, not only the cognitive distance between firms, but also that 
within firms inside the TNC demands attention. The dynamic changes of cognitive distance have not been 
investigated thoroughly. We will illustrate this in the empirical section. 
3.3 Absorptive and communicative capabilities 
As mentioned in the section above, cognitive distance can be shortened or crossed, with two kinds of 
capabilities being important for this process. One is absorptive capability. The other is communicative 
capability, which is defined as the ability to help others understand what we do or say. Put another way, it 
is A trying to tell B what he knows in terms of B‟s knowledge. Note the difference between (partly) 
understanding what others know and how they think, and having the same knowledge. As individual 
capability is an essential component of organizational learning capabilities, we believe that two factors are 
important for Chinese TNCs to reduce the obstacles caused by cognitive distances. 
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One is the strong motivation of knowledge acquisition. Knowledge-seeking is believed to be a strong 
intention of Chinese investment in developed economies. The strong active knowledge absorptive ability is 
emphasized for latecomer firms including TNCs from China in order to engage in the catching-up process 
in the global economy (Mathews, 2002; Liefner et al., 2012). To run a TNC successfully, transnationalizing 
entrepreneurship, which refers to the ability of actors to create and capitalize on multiple spaces, territories 
and scales (Yeung, 2009), is also of importance. 
The other factor is the ability of individuals to manage cross-country business, which influences the 
learning process. For newly established and small companies, the composition and prior experience of 
management teams are essential (Reuber and Fischer, 1997). For large firms, the composition of employees 
plays a role as well. For the subsidiaries of Chinese TNCs in Germany, the managers who have experience 
and capabilities to understand and communicate Chinese and German knowledge are extremely important 
for the subsidiary. This difficulty could also be overcome through cooperation and negotiation between 
German and Chinese people inside management groups or even among employees. 
4 Methods and data 
A qualitative approach is concerned with how and why things happen, allowing the investigation of 
contextual realities and of the differences between what was planned and what actually occurred (Anderson, 
1993). It is a useful method when the area of research is less well known and the researcher is engaged in 
theory-building types of research (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). Since we attempt to reveal the underlying 
mechanisms of Chinese outward FDI in Germany, which has only attracted attention in the last ten years, a 
qualitative study is indeed a good option. 
Our research involves data collection through multiple sources (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). The 
main information was collected from 18 face-to-face interviews with Chinese TNC subsidiaries in 
Germany and 3 interviews with HQ in China from April 2011 to February 2012. Each interview lasted 
between 45 minutes and 2 hours. We have excluded independent Chinese-owned firms in Germany, 
particularly hotels, restaurants and supermarkets. The chosen firms are subsidiaries of sales and after-sales 
functions of manufacturing industries, with an average age of 6 years. Three of them have R&D functions 
as well. For subsidiaries with less than 10 employees, the interviewees were mainly general managers or 
even founders of the subsidiaries. For larger-scale subsidiaries, more than 2 interviews were carried out 
involving PR managers, chief technology managers or engineers, as well as general managers. We talked 
with some of them more than twice if necessary and obtained the updated information from them 
informally as well. 
35 more interviews were conducted with authorities, associations, service firms, local cooperators and 
academic researchers in Germany who have deep and fluent contacts with Chinese TNC subsidiaries. Since 
these interviews were carried out anonymously, we have named them Chinese firm 1, 2 …n and consultant 
1, 2 …n etc, unless the interviewees agreed to release their names. The interviews provide sound comments 
and evaluation of subsidiaries‟ behavior with independent ideas. 
Moreover, supplementary information was taken from archived documents, such as corporate reports 
(including website), published books (e.g. Ren, 2001; Wu and Ji, 2009; Zhou, 2011), magazine reports, 
which included more than fifteen published interviews with the CEOs and management groups of Chinese 
TNCs, and local Chinese newspapers in Germany, such as Hua Shang Bao (the Chinese Business 
Newspaper) and Ou Zhou Xin Bao (the Europe Times). Some 2000 pages of the archival documents were 
collected, most of which are written in Chinese. Only data corroborated from more than two document 
sources were used. When citing information from these sources, we will state the firm name and the 
information of the interviewees as well. These documents and the archive give us a comparatively complete 
figure of the internationalization of Chinese firms in Germany. The data source triangulation reduces 
Article 4 Emerging Cognitive Distance within and between Firms Si, Liefner 
79 
 
random measurement error (Kumar et al., 1993) and provides us with a better foundation than that of 
existing studies. 
We cite the information from the interviews directly as the evidence for testing the existing theories 
and supporting our arguments. This kind of direct citation and description has been used widely in human 
and economic geographical research (Yeung, 1998; Li and Bathelt, 2012), and particularly in the study of 
TNCs (Faulconbridge, 2008).  
5 Empirical observations 
From the empirical study, we observed that the cognitive distance between Chinese firms and German 
locality is the reason for Chinese investment in Germany. The huge novelty value stemming from the great 
cognitive distance attracts Chinese firms in their ambition to realize the new combination of knowledge and 
resources from these two countries. However, the cognitive distance is too great to be easily crossed. 
Therefore, Chinese enterprises establish subsidiaries in Germany to divide this cognitive distance into two 
parts: cognitive distance between HQ in China and subsidiaries in Germany, and that between the 
subsidiaries and Germany itself. Here, German locality refers to the customers (individuals or firms), 
suppliers and other organizations along the value chain. In the following paragraphs, we firstly present 
causes of cognitive distance between HQ in China and German locality. We then explain how the 
subsidiaries reduce or cross cognitive distance. Thirdly, we illustrate the cognitive distance changes after 
the establishment of subsidiaries. Finally, we present the characteristics of firms which successfully 
overcome the difficulties from cognitive distance and achieve business success from the combination of 
knowledge from Germany and China. 
5.1 What causes cognitive distance? 
The cognitive distance between Chinese TNC HQ and German locality is caused by three kinds of 
knowledge differences between China and Germany. 
The first fundamental difference is language. The native language in China is Chinese, while that in 
Germany is German. Individuals who can speak both languages are rare both in China and in Germany. 
Although both countries share the same second language, i.e. English, not every employee is fluent in it. 
The language incompetence causes many misunderstandings and difficulties between the two sides (Wang 
and Noisser, 2008). As consultant 1 asserted: 
“Without understanding the language, it is difficult for most of the Chinese to understand 
German thoughts. I remember on a visa form, one Chinese interpreter wrote: “I speak and hear 
German.” But the right word would have been „understand‟ rather than 'hear'. ” 
The second difference is institutions. Germany has a well-developed legal system enabling contractual 
agreement and control after transaction, including a transparent information system and legal framework, 
and trust based on contracts. In this environment, German firms prefer to hire professional service firms 
such as law firms, accountants and tax advisers to help them deal with the complex institutions, and they 
search for and release information via formal channels, such as websites and newspapers. In China, keeping 
good relationships with government is important. Companies emphasize the importance of Guanxi or 
ethical relationships (Qiu, 2005), and are inclined to search for and contact partners via informal channels, 
such as telephone conversations and dinner together. Negotiation is carried out before the formal discussion 
about contracts. Some firms and businessmen do not realize the institutional differences between China and 
Germany and therefore lack the institutional knowledge about their counterparts. This lack of awareness 
about knowledge differences causes a lot of misunderstanding. Consultant 2 gave us a good example:  
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“China rules the country based on people, while Germany rules through law. In China, channels 
and connections with the government are important; in Germany, knowing the rules is important. A 
small Chinese company did business well in Germany but the manager thought it too time consuming 
to claim the tax, so he asked a tax adviser whether it was possible to give some money to a 
government officer and save his trouble. When he asked, he didn‟t realize the importance of following 
the legal and accounting system. That is also why Chinese companies don‟t have a good reputation 
here. ” 
German customer 1 made several mistakes because of institutional differences as well: 
“We made a lot of mistakes by trusting the information on the Chinese firm website. At first, we 
checked the certificate on their website and ordered their products directly. The products were not as 
good as we assumed. Now we have to go to Chinese firms and check whether the manager is 
trustworthy and the products are of good quality.” 
Chinese TNC subsidiary 1 complained: 
“We had a nice talk with our German partners and we trusted them, that was why we didn‟t 
check the contract very carefully. However, the contract didn‟t turn out as we assumed. There were a 
lot of „legal traps‟ and it cost us a lot of money later. ” 
The institutional knowledge is mostly tacit knowledge beyond people‟s awareness. This kind of 
misunderstanding could lead to distrust and do more harm to further business development than language. 
It is a major cause of cognitive distance. 
The third difference is technical or market knowledge highly related to products and service. It is not 
difficult to understand that different customers in different countries have different tastes concerning 
products. Moreover, the product technology is also different because it needs to suit the market preferences. 
As the manager of Chinese TNC subsidiary 2 mentioned: 
“The construction machinery manufacturing enterprises in China emphasize the knowledge 
which could produce the machine fast and cheaply because of the huge demand from Chinese real 
estate markets. Every Chinese firm wants to expand and occupy a larger portion of the market in a 
short time. In Germany, the market need is different and the technology is also different. Firms seek to 
produce humane products which are easy and comfortable to use and to repair. That is why our 
products are not popular in Germany, and that is also why we invest in Germany (to learn from 
German standards and technical knowledge).” 
The three kinds of knowledge differences function differently. Language and institutional knowledge 
differences mainly cause the misunderstandings between Chinese enterprises and Germany, while technical 
and market-related knowledge could potentially provide novelty through a new combination of knowledge. 
As the CEO of the Chinese firm Sany, who represents the views of HQ in China, claims: 
“If we can successfully combine the knowledge from China and from Germany, we can produce 
products with Chinese costs and German quality. Our products would be very competitive in the 
global market
2
.” 
5.2 Why carry out FDI in Germany? A stepping stone with two faces 
Can the establishment of the overseas subsidiaries help Chinese TNCs overcome the obstacles caused by 
the cognitive distance between China and Germany? What is the supposed function of these subsidiaries? 
                                                          
2
The talk about the investment of Sany in Germany by Liang Wengen 
http://news.sohu.com/20120625/n346425681.shtml 
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This section illuminates the issues in detail. Firstly, we present some information from the interviews with 
managers of subsidiaries: 
“Our company already had customers in Germany and Europe (before the establishment of this 
subsidiary); however, we couldn‟t understand our customers fully and quickly. That is also the reason 
for the existence of this subsidiary. Now we can visit our customers frequently and know their 
demands immediately. Our potential customers can also visit us and know more about our products 
personally. All the information we collect is transferred back to the HQ in China” (Chinese TNC 
subsidiary 3). 
“We function as a switch or translator between German customers and Chinese parent firms. 
For example, a German customer orders service from our German branch but we need to provide 
service in Germany and in China. In Germany, I just need to tell our technical employees to provide 
them with normal service, however I need to tell the Chinese branch to provide VIP service and I need 
to travel back to China personally to make sure of the quality of service. When we talk about the 
translation of different standards, it seems pretty easy, but a lot of firms do not realize the quality 
difference or don‟t have the ability to guarantee equal service globally, and therefore they 
lose”(Chinese TNC subsidiary 4). 
“This subsidiary is quite important for the exchange of knowledge between Chinese HQ and 
German customers. Our R&D employees (in the subsidiary) discuss with German customers in order 
to find out their real demand and then tell R&D employees in China the original idea of products via 
telephone conference, video conference, e-mails or meeting face-to-face. Then they need to 
understand the products‟ design, which is mainly done in China, and explain it to our German 
customers”(Chinese TNC subsidiary 5). 
“As a part of the firm (Chinese TNC), we know our products very well, including their 
advantages and disadvantages. As a firm in Germany, we also know the German market and firms. 
We could find market opportunity in Germany for our parent firm in China and we could also find 
some potential firms or technology to merge. Knowing both sides is the advantage of an overseas 
subsidiary”(Chinese TNC subsidiary 6). 
Based on these interviews, we can preliminarily conclude that the establishment of a subsidiary is used 
to bridge the cognitive distance. It is intended to function as a translator or switcher to help both sides 
understand each other. This finding is consistent with the argument from the updated Uppsala model: the 
boundary of a TNC is expanded and the overseas subsidiary is founded to overcome the liability of being 
an outsider and therefore to benefit from “being inside the local network” (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). 
To fulfill this function, an overseas subsidiary needs to have “two faces”: it needs to understand 
knowledge from China and from Germany, such as language, signals or behavior, and to be aware of the 
similarities and differences between the two sides and to be able to explain them clearly. To use a simile, a 
subsidiary is like the “hybrid” of Germany and China. To be specific, an overseas subsidiary needs to deal 
with two cognitive distances and create a balance between them. 
On the one hand, a subsidiary needs to reduce cognitive distance with German locality by speaking 
and understanding the German language and respecting and following German institutions, as consultant 3, 
who had more than 10 years‟ working experience with German-Chinese economic cooperation, said: 
“I saw a lot of German firms make mistakes when they did business in China and I hope the Chinese 
investors in Germany will not make the same mistakes again. No matter where the capital comes from, 
a firm in Germany has to act as a German firm by following all the rules here. This is the only path to 
success.” 
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Based on the „identification‟, trust could be established and the tacit knowledge related to market or 
technology could be exchanged and shared between subsidiaries and German locality through frequent 
meeting and communication taking advantage of geographical proximity (Desrochers, 2001). 
On the other hand, an overseas subsidiary needs to cross the cognitive distance with HQ in China. 
Chinese is normally the only language for discussion and communication, therefore language is not the 
main reason for the difficulties. The cognitive distance mainly stems from the different institutional 
environment, and the employees of subsidiaries could make an effort to understand and respect the 
institutions in China in order to enable the bridging of the cognitive distance. The manager of Chinese TNC 
subsidiary 5 explains: 
“The communication with HQ can only be done by our Chinese employees in the subsidiaries. 
They (HQ) don‟t care about the schedule and they are flexible regarding the plan, which can‟t be 
understood by German employees.” 
The organizational proximity between HQ and the subsidiary in Germany enables the interaction 
across geographical distance via e-mails, telephone conferences, mutual human resources training and face-
to-face interaction. Several interviewees admitted that they spend one-third to half a year in China on 
average to supervise the knowledge exchange and sharing. Just as Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) claim, 
the primary reason why TNCs exist is because of their ability to transfer and exploit knowledge more 
effectively and efficiently in the intra-corporate context. 
5.3 Dynamics: The increasing importance of cognitive distance between headquarters 
and subsidiary 
In the above analysis, subsidiaries are established to help Chinese TNCs cross the cognitive distance with 
German locality, and in order to fulfill this function, subsidiaries are inclined to learn to reduce the 
cognitive distance with German locality first. What exactly is the learning effect? Does the learning work? 
What happens to subsidiaries 5 or 10 years after their establishment and after years of deepened 
embeddedness? 
Our survey suggests that individual learning in subsidiaries in the more formal business culture shifts 
the understanding, the values and the ideas of the managers in the subsidiary; however, this move is not 
easily understood back in China. The cognitive distance between HQ in China and subsidiaries in Germany 
is increasingly becoming another source of obstacles. 
The subsidiaries hold the opinion that they have struggled very hard to survive in a foreign country. 
However, they have not received more trust and support from HQ as time passes. The incompetence and 
distrust of HQ is the cause of their difficulties. The manager of Chinese TNC subsidiary 7 was very 
disappointed with HQ: 
“It is really not easy to communicate with the board back in China. They can‟t understand what 
is happening in Germany. The CEO is not well educated. It was possible (for him) to run a firm with 
dozens of employees based on experience. But it can‟t work for a firm with thousands of employees, 
particularly with international ambition.” 
Meanwhile, HQ often thinks that it is wise not to trust the subsidiaries totally. The employees may 
leave after acquiring enough knowledge about the local business environment. The HQ of Chinese TNC 8 
stated: 
“We made a lot of mistakes trusting the subsidiaries. We spent a lot of money sending employees 
to Germany but we are not sure what happened there. Some employees quit the job after two or three 
years and established sales branches alone to compete with us.” 
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Repeated and similar complaints from subsidiaries against HQ reflect the fact that managers and 
employees in the subsidiaries did not fully understand their supposed function and paid much more 
attention to the cooperation with German locality while neglecting the importance of communication with 
HQ. Some of them were not aware of their knowledge and routine changes after spending a long time in 
Germany. These all cause the increasing cognitive distance between subsidiaries and HQ, which is then 
more difficult to reduce or cross than at the beginning. 
5.4 The ability is important: the capability of subsidiaries and the delocalization of 
headquarters 
Since overseas subsidiaries need to survive in a foreign and unfamiliar country and at the same time 
balance the cognitive distances with HQ and with German locality, many subsidiaries turn out to be failures. 
It has been reported that 70% of Chinese MNEs have not become profitable abroad
3
. In this section, we 
establish the characteristics of successful ones based on our interviews and observations. Here, we define 
success according to the stability of employee numbers. During the interviews, we inquired as to the 
employee numbers in the past three years. If the amount went up steadily, we regarded the company as a 
successful one. 
The first characteristic is the heterogeneous personnel and cooperation between German and Chinese 
people within subsidiaries, which is essential for subsidiaries to act as „German-Chinese hybrids‟. A 
heterogeneous management group is important. Take Chinese TNC subsidiary 5 as an example. The 
general manager of this subsidiary is an overseas Chinese. He hired two vice managers, an experienced 
German responsible for marketing and a Chinese for logistics and communication with the Chinese parent 
company. He stated: 
“The differences between German (customers) and the Chinese (HQ) are settled by the 
heterogeneous management group. That is our main advantage compared with German or Chinese 
enterprises.” 
Meanwhile, the joint work between German and Chinese employees is important in big companies as 
well. The “2-in-the-box” system, which means that a German and a Chinese work together for an 
assignment, was introduced in two successful Chinese TNCs: Huawei and Lenovo. Take Lenovo as an 
example: initially, “2-in-the-box” was introduced to accelerate the exchange between the two cultures. For 
example, in the supply chain area, German and Chinese employees worked together on a project in order to 
understand as quickly as possible the system, the problems and the advantages of their partner‟s way of 
doing things, and above all in order to merge their networks. At the start of the convergence process in 
particular, this system provided a real boost. Lenovo also acknowledged that internationally mixed teams 
which work together on the basis of mutual trust and intercultural understanding are essential for becoming 
a truly internationally competitive enterprise (Sohm et al., 2009). 
The second secret of success is the de-localization of HQ and detachment between HQ and Chinese 
subsidiaries in China associated with strong international entrepreneurship (Yeung, 2009). Huawei is a 
good example. The interviewee told us that the Chairman of Huawei possesses strong internationalization 
entrepreneurship and supports the market expansion of overseas subsidiaries fully. He also encourages 
everyone in the top management group to spend more than one year abroad to “unlearn the Chinese habit 
and think internationally”. The HQ gradually improves capabilities through learning by experience 
(Johnason and Vahlne, 2009), eventually becoming internationally successful. 
Thirdly, the global flow of employees is also important. When Lenovo Germany recruits new 
employees, vacancies are always advertised globally within the corporation first, and then made public, the 
                                                          
3
  http://info.yidaba.com/201202/111144111007100100000408079.html 
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aim of which is to hire the best people from every culture (Sohm et al., 2009), and therefore to reduce the 
cognitive distances among subsidiaries inside Lenovo. It is similar in Chinese TNC subsidiary 9. The 
interview produced a similar statement: 
“The Chinese enterprises need to run the business according to the international standard. The 
employees in both overseas branches and the domestic market need to keep the international concept 
in mind.” 
Finally, the international experience matters as well. The firms such as Huawei, Lenovo and Sany, 
which had their international operation abroad before entering the German market, have fewer issues with 
HQ and handle the issues such as image relations with the local public better (Tirpitz et al., 2011). The 
international experience is learned by doing, therefore the longer the firms operate internationally, the 
better the subsidiaries in Germany handle the cognitive distances. 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper introduces the cognitive distance concept into the analysis of Chinese TNCs‟ investment in 
Germany. We find that an overseas subsidiary is established to divide the cognitive distance between HQ in 
China and the German locality into two parts - one with German locality and the other with HQ in China - 
and then to reduce or bridge the cognitive distances separately. The former is mainly reduced by repeated 
communication associated with geographical proximity, while the latter by organizational proximity. As 
time passes, the latter becomes a more important cause of the obstacles. The findings contribute to an 
understanding of how TNC subsidiaries can configure themselves in order to respond to the multifaceted 
and differentiated context. 
Our research results have three theoretical implications: firstly, it has become apparent that the 
concept of cognitive distance is a dynamic inter-firm relationship concept widely applicable in internal and 
external network studies, which is also deeply related to country-level institutional factors. It provides a 
good framework for evaluating the evolution of an MNE in the internationalization process, the 
institutional interaction between the host country and the home country via communication, as well as 
coordination inside MNEs. Secondly, the optimal cognitive distance model is a rational and static model 
which is not the same as what really happens to Chinese TNCs. The firms did not invest in the locations 
with optimal cognitive distance, instead being attracted by the huge novelty value between China and 
Germany. The established subsidiaries then adapt their thoughts and behavior to move towards the optimal 
position. Our work illustrates the dynamic changes when the cognitive distance model is applied to the 
TNC subsidiary analysis. Thirdly, we provide evidence of how a global pipeline could be founded and 
implemented by bridging and reducing the cognitive distance along the pipeline. We also argue that if the 
cognitive distance cannot be effectively overcome, a dysfunctional pipeline can impede the success of the 
investment made, which can be bad for the subsidiary, its host regions and cluster, and can have negative 
effects for the investing firm as a whole, therefore limiting the positive impact of the investment on the host 
region. The firm perspective thus offers a complementary view that may contradict what we find with an 
examination of regions and network linkages only.  
Here, we need to mention that neither cognitive distance nor pipeline analysis involves a power 
relation discussion. However, to understand the FDI from China to Germany more clearly, taking a brief 
look at power differences in the two contexts is helpful. Based on theory, one has to assume that superior 
knowledge, for example technical expertise, relates to the power to arrange cooperation and knowledge 
exchange. Consequently, before we conducted the interviews, we anticipated that German locality may 
have the upper hand and Chinese firms would need to learn the right (German) way. However, the 
empirical evidence does not support our assumption. Chinese firms in Germany mainly collect the market 
knowledge from customers, and their inter-firm linkages within the local networks are weak, with the 
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technical knowledge acquisition from German parts also being rare. Several factors could lead to this result: 
firstly, Chinese FDI in Germany is still in the initial stage with sales and after-sales-service as its main 
functions. The technical or industrial linkages with the German firms are not as strong as assumed. 
Secondly, the knowledge acquisition through inter-firm linkage is difficult, since the German firms treat 
Chinese firms as competitors and are afraid that Chinese firms may take techniques back to China, which 
would cause German firms to lose their competitiveness. The knowledge acquisition could be realized by 
M&A and the knowledge flow inside the firms. However, we did not discuss the M&As in detail in this 
article, since they have appeared in Germany only in the last 3 years, while M&As normally take 5 years or 
longer. It is thus too early to say whether they are successful or not. It will be an interesting topic for 
Chinese FDI in the future. As of today, superior technology does not give the German subsidiaries the 
upper hand in their contacts with China. What we did observe via our interviews is that the Chinese firms 
in developed economies are faced with more suspicions than any TNCs in China, such as „made in China‟ 
equating to bad quality and them being “copy cats” who could steal knowledge and cause job losses in 
Germany, and so on. Therefore, Chinese firms have the strong intention to learn how to operate a modern 
company with transparency and a good social image. The managerial learning from the German institutions 
is more obvious than the technical learning. 
Our results may have some fundamental implications for MNEs from developing economies. 
Internationalization is becoming a valuable strategy for enterprises. It is important for HQ to choose the 
right group management composition before establishing a new foreign subsidiary. The overseas Chinese 
who can handle both Chinese and Western business, for example the general manager with a heterogeneous 
management group, seem important. The overseas experience of the management group in the HQ and the 
frequent flows of employees among different subsidiaries also help the unlearning of Chinese habits and 
the de-localization of HQ.  
Our results may have some policy implications as well. Most importantly, local support – public or 
private – for new affiliates in the host region needs to be rearranged. It is not sufficient to attract investment 
and help firms to become embedded. A more far-sighted approach is needed. The creation of a pool of 
people who are familiar with both business cultures and countries would be most promising in the long 
term. In the short term, the local affiliates should be supported in their struggle to communicate effectively 
with their parent firms, for example with information about the local business culture and its rules, and the 
offer to communicate with representatives of the host region that travel to China.  
As this study has been an initial attempt to understand how Chinese investment in developed 
economies is organized and can be successful, future research could investigate different directions. It 
seems promising to move towards quantitative methods and to extend this to other countries of FDI origin 
as well as to other host countries. 
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Appendix 1 Discussion Guide for Expert Interview 
The Embeddedness of Chinese Outward FDI in German Local Network 
Section 1: General information 
1. What kind of organization? ( where applicable) 
 Profit  
 Non-profit 
2. Do you receive support from Government? ( where applicable) 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, from which country? ( where applicable) 
 From China 
 From Germany 
 From European Union 
 Others 
3. What is the function of your organization? 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. How important the following for keeping connection with you 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to market and industry information 
     
Getting to know business partners 
     
Expanding financing channels 
     
Establishing contact with universities/research institutions 
     
Get familiar with the German culture 
     
Acquiring highly qualifies staff 
     
Negotiating with government  
     
5. History of your organization, and other information 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Your position and responsibility 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
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Section 2: The development of Chinese Outward FDI in Germany 
7. How do the Chinese companies develop in Germany? Overall 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
8. Are there any regional priorities for the location? Where and why? 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Which sectors and industries does Chinese Outward FDI focus on? 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
10. Which strategy leads Chinese companies to their internationalization?  
 Newly built/Greenfield investment  
 Merger/acquisition  
 Initial public offering (IPO) 
 Joint Venture 
11. What characters do the comparatively successful or promising Chinese firms have? For example, the 
ownership (private, state owned enterprises, or others), the size (big or small multinational enterprises, 
small- and medium enterprises)? 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
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Section 3: Motivations and strategies for Chinese firms in Germany 
12. Why do your company choose overseas investment? 
Main Choices Note 
(O) Exploit ownership advantage 
Chinese biggest market and customers  
Access to resources  
Technique  
Low cost  
(L) Location advantage 
Push factors 
 
Home country 
Limited market
 
 
Limited natural resource  
Limited technique and information  
Product cost  
Trade conditions  
Policies  
Pull factors  
 
Host country 
Market  
Natural resources  
Technique and information   
Cost  
Image of location (Germany)  
Other business facilitation (finance, human 
network) 
 
Policy framework 
 
(I) Internalization advantage 
Business strategy 
Follow suppliers and partners 
 
Transaction cost decrease  
Acquire an internationally recognized brand 
 
13. What are the advantages of Chinese company compared with local German peers? 
Type of advantage Options Note 
Ownership  
Expertise and technique  
Management  
Access to home country resources 
Access to natural resources  
Huge customers to test  
Access to finance and other infrastructure  
Low labor cost  
Production process and value chain 
niches 
Specialization among value chain  
Cluster  
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Networks and relationship  Business models, based on Kinship (Guanxi)  
Organizational structure and business 
culture 
Forms of governance (family firm, state-
owned enterprise) 
 
14. Please evaluate the change of the following performance of local subsidiary in last five years? ( where 
applicable) 
 More market share 
 Better access to natural resources 
 More skilled workers and knowledge 
 Cost reduction 
 More attractive product design and Better product quality 
 managerial upgrade 
 Financing capability 
 Social and human network, Global market information 
 Better brand 
 Other ________________ 
15. Are government incentives important for investment by Chinese companies? (Go-Global Strategy) 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
16. How important is the factors of technical knowledge in their investment decision? Are there other skills 
and motives Chinese companies aim at? How Germany acts about it? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
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Section 4: Local cooperation and knowledge augment of Chinese companies in Germany 
17. Are Chinese firms embedded in the local network?  
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Do they have strong business cooperation with German companies, or Chinese companies? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Do Chinese companies use external consultants in Germany to develop their business? (Consulting 
firms, business development, association or organizations, etc.). Which are more important for them, 
from China or Germany? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
18. From what resources do they get the business information? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
19. Do Chinese firms pay more attention to Guanxi? How it helps ( where applicable) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to technology 
     
Access to bank loans 
     
Access to government funds 
     
Access to German market 
     
Recruitment of skilled personal 
     
Access to reliable Policy information 
     
20. What are the differences of Chinese firms with others abroad? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
21. What kind of benefit and harm does Germany get from Chinese OFDI? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
22. What kind of benefit can parent company in china get? 
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________  
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Appendix 2 Discussion Guide for Company Interview 
The Embeddedness of Chinese Outward FDI in German Local Network
Section 1: General information 
1. When did your company first invest in 
Germany: ( where applicable) 
 Itself ________________  
 Headquarter in Germany(if have) 
____________ 
2. Please indicate your company‟s position as… 
( where applicable) 
 Sole firm company 
 Headquarter of multi-firm company  
 Regional headquarter 
 Hesse  
 Germany  
 Europe 
 Affiliate of multi-firm company  
 Headquarter of parent company in 
_________  
3. Please indicate your company‟s ownership 
status: ( where applicable)  
 Chinese-owned enterprises  
 State-owned enterprises 
 Collective-owned   
 Private 
 Chinese-foreign equity joint venture 
 With Germany _____% 
 With _____ (country)  _____% 
4. Which province do your come from_________ 
5. Please indicate industry of your 
operation:_____________________________ 
6. Please indicate activities of your operation ( 
where applicable):  
 Representative office 
 Manufacturing 
 Research & Development (R&D) 
 Sourcing /distribution centre 
 Sales/ Marketing 
 Customer support 
 Other, please explore _________ 
7. How was the investment in your establishment 
accomplished? ( where applicable) 
 Newly built/Greenfield investment  
 Merger/acquisition  
 Initial public offering (IPO) 
 Joint Venture 
8. If M&A or IPO is there PE or VC involved?  
_____________________________ 
9. Is there any German in your top-level 
executives? What position? 
__________________________________ 
10. How do you estimate the development of your 
company in the three last years? ( where 
applicable) 
 Positive 
 Balanced 
 Negative 
11. Have you got bank loan( where applicable) 
 From China 
 From Germany 
 From Europe 
 None 
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12. How many employees (full time) do you have now, last year and next year? (to describe the 
development) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Company 
   
Local branch 
   
13. Which are important suppliers and market, china or Germany? Please indicate the regional distribution 
of your company‟s supplies and sales:  
Region China Germany Rest World  
a) Supply % % % = 100 % 
b) Sales % % % = 100 % 
14. Additional information about company‟s history of internationalization 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
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Section 2: Motivations 
15. Why does your company choose overseas investment? 
Main Choices Note 
(O) Exploit ownership advantage 
Chinese biggest market and customers
~
  
Access to resources  
Technique  
Low cost  
(L) Location advantage 
Push factors 
 
Home country 
Limited market
 
 
Limited natural resource  
Limited technique and information  
Product cost  
Trade conditions  
Policies  
Pull factors  
 
host country 
Market  
Natural resources  
Technique and information   
Cost  
Image of location (Germany)  
Other business facilitation (finance, human 
network) 
 
Policy framework 
 
(I) internalization advantage 
Business strategy 
Follow suppliers and partners 
 
Transaction cost decrease  
Acquire an internationally recognized brand 
 
16. What are the advantages of your company compared with local German peers? 
Type of advantage options Note 
Ownership  
Expertise and technique  
Management  
Access to home country resources 
Access to natural resources  
Huge customers to test  
Access to finance and other infrastructure  
Low labor cost  
Production process and value chain 
niches 
Specialization among value chain  
Cluster  
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Networks and relationship  Business models, based on Kinship (Guanxi)  
Organizational structure and business 
culture 
Forms of governance (family firm, state-owned) 
 
17. Please evaluate the change of the following performance in last five years? ( where applicable) 
 More market share 
 Better access to natural resources 
 More skilled workers and knowledge 
 Cost reduction 
 More attractive product design and Better product quality 
 managerial upgrade 
 Financing capability 
 Social and human network, Global market information 
 Better brand 
 Other ___________________________________________
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Section 3: Local cooperation and knowledge acquisition 
18. Which channel is more important for your managerial improvement (managerial knowledge 
acquisition), mark it by 1, 2, 3 
Main 
Note 
Cooperation based on business  
Cooperation based on non-business  
Labor flow  
External training  
Publication or report reading  
19. Could you tell me which sources help you most for your most important managerial knowledge 
acquisition channel? ( where applicable) 
Channel Sources 
 
Note 
Cooperation based on business 
Suppliers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Customers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Peers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Cooperation partners 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Parent/associate companies 
China  
Germany  
Rest World  
Cooperation based on non-business 
Universities, academy, R&D 
centers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Market, manager service 
company  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Lawyer, tax service providers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
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Germany  
Rest World  
Government and authority 
China
 
 
Germany
 
 
Rest World  
Economic development 
organization 
China
  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest world  
Friends classmates or relatives 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Labor flow 
Suppliers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Customers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Peers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Cooperation partners 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Parent/associate companies 
China  
Germany  
Rest World  
Universities, academy, R&D 
centers 
China  
Germany  
Rest World  
Market, manager service 
company  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Lawyer, tax service providers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
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Government and authority 
China
 
 
Germany
 
 
Rest World  
Economic development 
organization 
China
 
 
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest world  
20. Which channel is more important for your technology improvement (technical knowledge acquisition), 
mark it by 1, 2, 3 
Main 
Note 
Cooperation based on business  
Cooperation based on non-business  
Labor flow  
External training  
Publication or report reading  
21. Could you tell me which sources help you most for your most important technical knowledge 
acquisition? 
Channel Sources 
 
Note 
Cooperation based on business 
Suppliers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Customers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Peers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
cooperation partners 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Parent/associate companies 
China  
Germany  
Rest World  
Cooperation based on non-business 
Universities, academy, R&D centers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
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Market, manager service company  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Lawyer, tax service providers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Government and authority 
China
 
 
Germany
 
 
Rest World  
Economic development organization 
China
  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest world  
Friends classmates or relatives 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Labor flow 
Suppliers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Customers 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Peers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Cooperation partner 
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Parent/associate companies 
China  
Germany  
Rest World  
Universities, academy, R&D centers 
China  
Germany  
Rest World  
Market, manager service company  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
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Germany  
Rest World  
Lawyer, tax service providers  
China  
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest World  
Government and authority 
China
 
 
Germany
 
 
Rest World  
Economic development organization 
China
 
 
Chinese in Germany  
Germany  
Rest world  
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Section 4: Others 
22. If possible, could you tell me a good example, or bottleneck? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
23. Do you think Guanxi is important in Germany？__________________________________________ 
24. If yes，How important are personal networks to public officials for fulfilling the following tasks? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to technology 
     
Access to bank loans 
     
Access to government funds 
     
Access to German market 
     
Recruitment of skilled personal 
     
Access to reliable Policy information 
     
25. In which aspect does your investment benefit the Germany? (direction of information) 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
26. What is your contribution to the whole development of mother firm? (direction of information) 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
27. Could you give us your three important co-operators? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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